


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KISSINGER &
MOYNIHAN
IN CONCERT



PHILLIPS  ROBINSON 
GUTTMAN  KOHUT 
ROPER  KIRKPATRICK 
FOUR GOP STRATEGISTS
CAPLOVITZ  & OTHERS

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From the Publisher



The publishers and editors of *Public Opinion*, and the entire AEI community, were pleased and moved by the reception accorded our first issue. We were delighted by the press coverage, the calls, letters and, not least, by a mini-avalanche of returned subscription cards. Judging from the robust reaction, we sensed our readers somehow felt the magazine had always been around—so obvious was the need it filled.

* * *

Because a magazine is a process and not a single event, we move on now to try to understand that need more fully and to respond to it as well as we can. Accordingly, we ask readers of this issue to note two small and simple directional shifts in editorial policy: toward the specific—and toward the general.

Our sixteen-page center section, "Opinion Roundup," dealing with the results of specific survey data, has been expanded to twenty pages. In the language of our trade that might well be described as "a striking 25 percent increase in only two months." In any event: four more pages because so many readers noted how hard the data was to come by elsewhere and because we wanted to allow more commentary on some of the surveys.

At the same time the conversation with Dr. Kissinger and Senator Moynihan represents a move in a different direction. The field of public opinion can be seen in either a narrow or a broad context. As a narrow focus it can deal with survey research and, as a next step, with the social interpretation of survey research. This magazine will continue to emphasize that perspective

in coming issues. Seen more broadly, however, public opinion may also concern itself with vast and generalized mentalities and psychologies of groups as large as, say, "the Western world," as in the Kissinger-Moynihan instance. There is obviously precious little polling data about what may be causing "a crisis of spirit in the West"—and if there was, a lot of it might well prove to be silly at best. Still, it is an attitudinal subject that clearly needs exploration by persons of intellect and wits, even if the mode of exploration is more oriented toward general observations than to specific analyses of data. And so we offer the Kissinger-Moynihan conversation—and remarkable it is.

Through the medium of *Public Opinion* as through other AEI periodicals, programs and conferences, we also hope that we can help to make public policy the policy of the public. The premise of our entire effort at AEI is simply that competition of ideas is essential to the creation of better public policy.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Bill Baroody Jr." in a cursive, slightly slanted script.

William J. Baroody, Jr.
Publisher

Is There A Crisis of Spirit in the West?

**A Conversation with
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger &
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan**

Photographs by Marianne Pernold



Discussion between Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
on April 12, 1978, at AEI.
Ben J. Wattenberg moderates.

Ben J. Wattenberg: Gentlemen, in order to begin this discussion, we have prepared a short preliminary statement for your consideration:

Our central question is whether there is a "crisis of spirit" in the West, and if so, what could, or should, be done about it.

It has seemed to many observers in recent years that the core of the Western dilemma is indeed in the realm of spirit—that we face a profound problem of public opinion, or perhaps more specifically, of elite opinion.

Consider the situation: a collection of nations—successful beyond belief, industrially dominant, technologically potent, responding demonstrably to time-honored human desires—is found to be under both physical and ideological threat.

Militarily, our primary challenger has mounted a massive build-up of arms, and even though a plurality of Americans now say for the first time that the Soviet Union—not the United States—is the most powerful military force in the world, our leadership seems to shirk from redressing the military balance, as we have seen most recently in decisions concerning new weapons systems. In various trouble spots around the world—Africa the most noticeable right now—the public seems unwilling to support strong Western initiatives and the Communist side has advanced. Intellectually, our values are under siege from what has been called "the totalitarian temptation." Communism in Western Europe has gained ground—if not in the popular vote, surely by many political tests. Our nations are assailed in international forums for colonial guilt, economic rape and underwater plunder.

Challenged militarily, ideologically and economically, the nations of the West seem to respond reluctantly and with a noticeable lack of passion. Ironically, most observers are convinced that if the Western nations would choose to muster their forces, most of these threats would diminish, in degree if not in kind. The flesh is willing, the spirit is weak.

Dr. Kissinger, you have said that the Western world suffers from an



"Most elites that lose wars lose their heads in the process. That has happened in this country in a way, and it has meant great internal change."

"inner uncertainty" and that "the aspect of contemporary life that worries me most is the lack of purpose and direction in so much of the Western world."

Senator Moynihan, you have talked of a "failure of nerve" on the part of the West.

In the past, you gentlemen have agreed on many questions pertaining to these issues and you have disagreed on others. Today we would like to explore your current feelings in the context of a free-flowing conversation.

Senator Moynihan, perhaps you could begin. You have spoken of a failure of nerve in the past. Do you still see a failure of nerve and is it currently affecting our foreign policy?

Daniel P. Moynihan: Very much. More so now than a few years ago when I originally sensed it.

First, we had the enormous failure of Vietnam, which was an enterprise begun by an extraordinarily confident and powerful foreign policy establishment—a bipartisan establishment—which had run affairs for a quarter century. That establishment may have been performing with diminishing degrees of success, but overall it had done a brilliant job and it had never had a failure.

Then came Vietnam, and when it failed, something more important than that happened. The social base on which that elite rested turned against its own policies. The great symbolic moment, at least in my mind, occurred at the Kennedy Institute of Politics one evening in the fall of 1966 when Robert McNamara came and suddenly found himself and his car surrounded by protesting students. I was in Cambridge at the time, and we were dazed, uncertain of what was happening. After all, McNamara had been President Kennedy's secretary of defense, and his visit symbolized many things. He was coming to the Kennedy Institute of Politics, to Kennedy's university, to his own graduate school, to talk about the war—and suddenly he found that the very base of his establishment had turned. That had to be an unnerving experience, and it was.

Most elites that lose wars lose their heads in the process. That has happened in this country in a way, and it has made for great internal change. I have this joke—which Henry may or may not appreciate—about the people who started the war and ran it and are still working here in Washington. Their excuse today is that "I was only giving orders." [Laughter.]

Mr. Wattenberg: Dr. Kissinger, do you agree that this failure of spirit, this crisis of spirit—if that is the correct phrase—is a phenomenon of elites, or is it of the public or both?

Henry A. Kissinger: I think there are three phenomena.

The first is the one that Pat described, the loss of nerve of the establishment that ran foreign policy in the postwar period and then conspicuously failed in Vietnam. Failure is always painful, and therefore, there is lacking now that supporting group which gives leaders in complicated situations self-confidence by conferring on them the approbation of people of prestige.

The second phenomenon is that partly among that group and partly among the intellectuals who grew up in that period—people of the ages, say, between thirty-five and forty and fifty—there developed not just a disappointment with a lost war but almost a *desire* to lose.

When we left Vietnam, it wasn't enough for the protestors that we got out. Vietnam had to be cut off from supplies. Our country was not permitted to have one vestige of possible success, lest we do it again. An attitude developed that we must not conduct any policy—other than rhetoric—anywhere in the world that might possibly succeed. This feeling goes beyond disillusionment with the war. It turns into a self-hatred in which, as Michael Ledeen said the other day in the *New Republic* (April 8, 1978), the myth is that "The

enemy is us."

Then a third problem going *beyond* Vietnam is that during the entire postwar period, there have been groups in the political establishment who have maintained that the whole cold war and the whole international enterprise were unnecessary, that the Soviets were misunderstood, and that there is a hardline group in the Kremlin opposing a softline group. In their perspective, the softline group always turns out to be the incumbent. The incumbent becomes a hardliner only in retrospect. As they saw it, Stalin was a softliner when he was in office, and Harry Hopkins was writing that, "Of course, we can trust Stalin, but we do not know what sinister forces are lurking in the dark recesses of the Kremlin." Similar claims were made about Khrushchev and are now being made about Brezhnev. But what you have now—through the demoralization of the establishment—is that this third group, which had always believed that there was no geopolitical problem and that there was no ideological problem, is much more unopposed today than it was in the past.

To summarize, I do not believe—in this country, at least—that there is a *public* problem. In this country we have a *leadership* problem. The public has a rather healthy perception, elemental perhaps, but fundamentally sound. **Senator Moynihan:** I would like very much to confirm my sense of the reality of that third group, that third phenomenon you describe. It's a phenomenon that is not normally absent from Western countries but that frequently appears under auspices that deprive it of some legitimacy, having said that as indirectly as I can. In recent years, that group appears to have been legitimized here by seeming to have been right about the foreign policy in the last decade.

Henry, you mentioned Ledeen's passage about the view that the enemy is us, Walt Kelley's phrase. I'll not forget an incident from the Vietnam period. We're sitting here today not very far from the Peace Corps headquarters. We developed the poverty program, OEO, in that building in 1963. I remember in Washington in 1969 there was an antiwar demonstration of some kind, and a group of returned Peace Corps volunteers took over that building and flew the Vietcong flag from the flagpole of the Peace Corps building. At that moment, it suddenly came to me that these young people had adopted an identification with the aggressor.

I'll tell a story. Fifteen years ago I was in Washington. Our children were young, and there was a movie shown called "The Swiss Family Robinson" which was an old sort of bowdlerized Robinson Crusoe. The Swiss Family is shipwrecked and has wonderful adventures. They do very clever things, and they get rescued finally. You had to take all the children to see this movie. One Saturday afternoon, we did, and everything was going nicely in this little movie house chirping with young children.

Suddenly the snake scene began. A little boy is playing around in the stream, probably doing something useful, gathering mussels or something, when the music begins to change, and the camera moves up above him to a tree.

And suddenly there it is—the *snake*! And the snake starts moving down slowly. The music gets very somber, and the theater falls absolutely silent. In the middle of that silence, my five-year-old daughter is heard to say, "That snake *likes* me." [Laughter.]

Now, that's normal in a five-year-old, but abnormal in a thirty-five-year-old. For, in fact, the snake wants to eat you. And I think we have some of that phenomenon in our country just now.

But I much agree with the secretary that it's a phenomenon, in a curious way, of leadership cadres and elites. The public is still very silent about it.

Dr. Kissinger: To take this point of Pat's, I think, for example, I can understand that people can come to the conclusion that a war is lost and that it has to be liquidated on the best terms available. This is a sad event because no one can want this country to lose a war. What I have difficulty understanding



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"... at the second and third levels of this administration, many people came in who are 'graduates' of the Vietnam period. . . . They have some convictions that if America is not to be punished for its presumption, then at least we must be sure that the country is never presumptuous enough to undertake any more distant enterprises."

is the *relish* in that event.

When I see, for example, the head of ACTION going to a meeting where the North Vietnamese ambassador upon joining the U.N. castigates the United States, and this American official says, "This is the proudest day of my life. This is what we've been working for all these years," that raises to me really profound questions about the fundamental motivation from the beginning.

Senator Moynihan: That scene where the Vietcong flag was flown from the Peace Corps headquarters took place during a demonstration which that particular man organized.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

Senator Moynihan: But I suggest to you that fear may be much more of an explanation of the problems we have been discussing than any perversity of mind, and that our difficulties would be even larger if, in fact, we had all become fearful.

Dr. Kissinger: We also have to remember that we are talking about decent people. We are not talking about a conspiracy.

Mr. Wattenberg: *I understand. But you are describing a mentality that you have seen developing in our country. Let me ask if that mentality is at work today in the State Department, in the White House, in the National Security Council, the Department of Defense?*

Senator Moynihan: I'll tell you where it is at work—and this will neither surprise nor please the former secretary—but that sort of mentality is at work now in our debates over Africa. We are continually told today that we *have* to do this or that, *accept* this or that unattractive option because if we do not, the Russians will send in the Cubans. And this *settles* an argument! That is the *end* of an argument. Well, you can see where that kind of assumption will get you eventually.

Dr. Kissinger: I think there are two problems with respect to your question, Ben. One, I believe that on the foreign policy side, at the second and third levels of this administration, many people came in who are "graduates" of this Vietnam period. Some of them, in fact supported the war at the beginning and are now working their way back by sometimes rewriting their own history. They have some convictions that if America is not to be punished for its presumption, then at least we must be sure that the country is never presumptuous enough to undertake any more distant enterprises.

Now, with respect to the point that Pat made, yes, we hear that if we don't do this or that, the Cubans will come in. I would say there will be no constructive policy in Africa until we make it clear that, however issues are settled, it will not be by the threat of Cuban intervention. After that point is established, we can have some sensible discussions. But if we are forever blackmailed by the Cubans—a country of nine million off our shores—no constructive policy is possible. What has become of our country when we explain foreign policy by the myth of the invincible Cubans?

Mr. Wattenberg: *As we have talked of this crisis of the spirit, you have both alluded to Vietnam, which was largely an American phenomenon. Yet this so-called malaise is apparently found throughout the Western world. Western Europe did not have that particular Vietnam problem, and yet this malaise seems to extend to there. Is that correct? Is that sort of spiritual disillusionment present on the continent as well as in the United States?*

Dr. Kissinger: I think there are a number of forces at work. One is the tendency to escape current dilemmas by making the most favorable assumption about the future. This temptation is overwhelming in societies on the whole satisfied with their lot, and it is one reason why the Communist challenge has been interpreted in the most benign fashion in every decade in the existence of Communism.

Second, there is the phenomenon that the modern bureaucratic state does not give the idealists among the younger generation an outlet for actions that they think might be relevant.

Third, there is the problem that as the pressures of their electoral process have increased, governments have become more and more tactically oriented. The more tactically oriented they are, the more short-term their policies. The more short-term their policies, the less successful they are. So we have the paradox that governments following public opinion polls begin to look more and more incompetent. And as they look incompetent, confidence in government begins to disintegrate, so that the rebels, or the radicals, or those who challenge the society, can get at least enough support for conspicuous terrorism or for the growth of the Communist parties in Western Europe.

I don't know what Pat thinks about that.

Senator Moynihan: That's a marvelous idea. The more inphase a government tries to get with opinion, the more confidence declines and the government feels that it must get even more inphase.

Dr. Kissinger: You see, I think what the public wants from its government is a solution to its problems. The public's perception of the solution may be very nebulous, and the public judges its leaders by the results, not by whether its policies follow every fad.

Senator Moynihan: But could I suggest that behind some of the psychological and political difficulties of today, there is an "objective reality"—the extraordinary success of Soviet policy.

Our former colleague, Adam Ulam, in an article in the *New Republic* in the spring of 1975, wrote that the Soviet Union under Brezhnev had achieved—and he said it would be both dangerous and ungenerous for us to deny it—the leading, if not yet the dominant position in world politics.

That dominance is clearly perceived in Western Europe, and it is beginning to be perceived here. I don't think anybody knows very much about how external politics affect mood and so forth; some people do, I don't anyway. But I said in a speech last weekend that it seemed to me that much of the difficulty we have understanding our Middle East situation is that for the first time, American policy is beginning to accommodate to the assumption that the Soviets are now, or soon will be, the superior military power.

Remarkably, we now have senior officials of this administration coming around to us in the Senate saying we must have a SALT treaty soon because if we do not, by the mid-1980s the Soviets will have surpassed us in strategic power.

I can imagine what you, Henry, would think about a negotiating position in which the other side had only to wait 2,000 days to get where they want to be. Surely we must be able to say to them, "Look, you had better deal with us now, or we will go back and raise such hell, we will double the defense budget, we will quadruple the budget; we can spend indefinitely such that when you are bankrupt we will not be, and so you had better negotiate with us." But if you have psychologically discarded that bargaining technique, then, in fact, you are disarmed.

I think this assumption about Soviet power is becoming an objective reality. If it does, it will begin to show up in ways that will baffle us because we have never, as a people, had the experience of being militarily inferior to anybody since about 1830. I should think Henry Clay would be the last secretary of state who would even give any thought to the idea.

Mr. Wattenberg: *We are running in this issue of Public Opinion magazine one of the first polls that I have ever seen that shows a plurality of the American people believing that the Soviet Union is stronger than the United States militarily.*


Senator Moynihan: You mentioned that in your opening statement, and I was going to ask where you got that.

Mr. Wattenberg: *It's a new poll. (See Opinion Roundup in this issue for the results.)*

Dr. Kissinger: I think one ought to get this question of Soviet strength into proper perspective. The Soviets have a stagnant system; they have not solved



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"What has become of our country when we explain foreign policy by the myth of the invincible Cubans?"

the problem of the modern economy and they cannot possibly solve it. We have problems with the economy, but we know ways of dealing with it, and our problems would be their successes if they could ever get to our situation. Furthermore, they have not solved the problem of succession. In no Communist country has there ever been a legitimate succession. Their foreign policy is basically unimaginative. The outstanding quality of the Soviet foreign policy is enormous persistence in whatever course they are pursuing, and this tends to play into our impatience. In a negotiation, if we haven't made a new proposal for three months, we start getting restless. And potentially, we are militarily stronger.

Therefore, I think, in terms of assets, as you said in the beginning, Ben, it is an absolute absurdity to say that the Soviets are stronger than we.

The Soviets have a bureaucratic, unimaginative society, in which all the leaders get old simultaneously, and it ought to be possible to manage whatever challenge they pose.

In every confrontation, we could have had the upper hand. We had them defeated in Angola, and then we defeated ourselves. I don't know what the possibilities were in Ethiopia. I *cannot* believe that a country of nine million can conduct a global policy and the greatest industrial state in the world cannot find a means of stopping it; I just can't believe that. So all I'm saying is that while the phenomenon is described correctly by Pat, there is no reason why this sense of inferiority or retreat has to happen here.

Mr. Wattenberg: *But our dilemma is that it is happening. Now both of you seem to be pointing to a lack of passion, of conviction in the essential idea of freedom and human liberty, which at one time was the greatest of rallying cries.*

Dr. Kissinger, in a recent paper of yours, you quoted Archibald MacLeish who said that "Freedom is still the last great revolutionary cause." Is the problem that the elites are unable to communicate to the voters in Western societies that freedom is still a cause of passion and ardor?

Dr. Kissinger: One other thing is missing. In addition to a belief in freedom, you must have a geopolitical theory or view. You have to know how to go from your values to your security, your world structure, or whatever it is you are aiming for. You cannot simply do it in a fit of moral enthusiasm.

Without the enthusiasm you will not have the fortitude to do what is necessary. But without some conception of what security is, of what it is that you cannot permit and what it is you are to try for, you really will be constantly confronted with a series of confusing situations through which you cannot find your way.

Senator Moynihan: I could point to a specific here of the Panama Canal treaties. Let me start by saying that President Carter has taken the issue of human rights and made it a central element in his foreign policy—for which all praise. However, it too often comes out as a doctrine directed against Nicaragua or . . .

Dr. Kissinger: (nodding) Against weak allies.

Senator Moynihan: Yes. Against weak allies.

But now if ever there was a situation where you would hope for a confident elite able to come down to the United States Senate and say, "Look, let's sign these Panama Canal treaties. This is a small country; it's been a good friend. The canal is perhaps a wasting asset, but it's the right thing to do. And we, people who spend most of our time thinking about these matters, say to you, let's do this, so we can get on with our real business in the world, which is maintaining the perimeters of freedom and expanding them as we can, and being a self-confident and vibrant alternative to totalitarianism around the world." Now that's what we need, but instead we have a spectacle; I'm afraid it is a spectacle of a *fearful* Senate—fearful of giving up the Panama Canal. Well, if you're fearful of that, think how much else you really are fearful about, in terms of what the world is really like. (Continued on page 58.)

THE ENERGY BATTLE: WHY THE WHITE HOUSE MISFIRED

BY KEVIN P. PHILLIPS

Rarely do political strategists reexamine their major legislative battles with the same prompt and meticulous care that one finds in the military. In politics, there are no staff colleges at Fort Leavenworth or Newport, Rhode Island to convert the engagements of yesterday into the lectures and casebook exercises of today. Typically, three to five years go by, and then some political scientist churns out a study that attracts almost as much attention to its learned footnotes as to its strategic perceptions.

The 1977-1978 struggle over President Jimmy Carter's energy program promises to be a case in point. In coming weeks, we can expect a few recapitulations in the press, a few rehashes, and then: wait for the scholars.

Yet, a year after the President declared his energy plan to be the "moral equivalent of war," with his forces now bruised and battered on almost every front, it is surely worth asking: What went wrong? What mistakes were made by the Carter energy planners equivalent to General Braddock's assumption that Western Pennsylvania, circa 1756, could be safely traversed by European-trained infantry wearing scarlet coats or to the belief of the French high command in the spring of 1940 that the Maginot Line would hold? Some of the basic answers about the Carter energy plan can be found, I submit, in the assumptions that the administration made about American public opinion—assumptions that from the beginning were highly questionable and in the end proved to be disastrously wrong.

To be sure, there were other mistakes made in devising the energy program—the failure to marshal enough technical expertise, the secret draftsmanship, the refusal to consult with industry, and so on—but let's skip by those here. Space also requires only a capsulized summary of the controversial notions contained in the energy plan—a new tax on gasoline, a new tax on gas-guzzling cars, a new tax on crude oil, possible use of those tax receipts for welfare outlays as well as rebates, conversion of businesses and utilities from oil and gas to coal, and continued control of natural gas (rather than the decontrol promised by candidate Carter in 1976). A useful attempt to relate the various parts of the program to one another came from Edward Mitchell, a University of Michigan professor and a leading energy economist:

The preference of houses over cars, non-energy over energy, solar energy over oil, indeed, almost any other source of energy over oil, is what leaps out at you when you read the National Energy Plan. You will not find these preferences explained in any economics book. The answer is found in political philosophy. . . . What makes the Carter program hang together, what makes the seeming hodgepodge of taxes, subsidies, directives, requirements, and clichés a whole, is ideology.¹

¹ Edward J. Mitchell, "Energy Politics: The Irrelevant Debate" in *Options for U.S. Energy Policy* (Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1978).

Having packaged this kind of (liberal) ideological program, one must presume the administration thought it reflected the mainstream of American opinion—or that it could be enacted regardless. As things turned out, however, the energy planners badly misread the public mood. For an administration that relies more heavily upon polls than almost any government in memory, almost to the point of fetish, it may be surprising that such a fundamental error might have been made. But it was, and it was not the only one by any means. After reviewing much of the survey data flowing into the White House from Pat Caddell and other pollsters, I believe there were at least half a dozen key misjudgments made by the administration:

1. The White House miscalculated the degree of public willingness to rest the economic future of the United States more on energy *conservation* than on expanded energy *production*.

2. It misjudged its ability to mobilize public understanding of shrinking U.S. energy resources and the extent of the national crisis.

3. It overestimated President Carter's future popularity and the willingness of the public to accept his views on technical and complex energy issues.

4. It also overestimated the degree of public enmity toward oil and gas companies and the willingness of the public to blame those companies for the energy crisis.

5. It misjudged the degree of public support for controlling, rather than decontrolling, the price of natural gas in order to increase supplies; and,

6. It badly misjudged mushrooming popular sentiment against rising taxes (the so-called "tax revolt").

That the administration could blindly wander into political quicksand on such fundamental issues goes far toward explaining why many of its specific proposals soon sank into oblivion on Capitol Hill. In April 1977, with President Carter still holding approval ratings in the 60-70 percent range, the energy package may have seemed like a bold political bid—but in retrospect, it was clearly overly bold with regard to public opinion and political opportunity. And thereby may hang the tale of its undoing.

Let's look at each of its misjudgments in turn.

Strategic Miscalculation #1: Energy Conservation. As an abstract proposition, the need for energy conservation in the United States is both obvious and pressing. However, the debate—and the ideological litmus—lies in the extent to which a program emphasizes conservation (a) for its own sake, or (b) as an adjunct to increased production, which in turn prolongs American economic growth and lifestyles as long as possible. In its purest, New Politics form, energy conservation is a cousin of environmental extremism—it is both anti-growth and anti-materialist and it is linked to the notion that small is beautiful and to the guilt-ridden idea

that greedy Americans consume too much of the world's energy resources. Ultraconservationists seek not just environmental change; they are also in hot pursuit of social, cultural and economic change. In sharp contrast, the average American accepts or thinks of conservation in a more limited way—mostly as a device for prolonging existing cultural systems and economic growth patterns.

In the crucial months of 1976 and early 1977, however, as the Carter energy package was taking shape, liberal pollsters who appear to have the greatest influence with the administration were reporting a definite trend toward a new, less materialist society. Louis Harris, for example, argued during early 1977 that the public fairly hungered for a puritanical approach to the energy crisis. In a February 1977 release, he said: "The public now feels it is necessary for the country to cut back drastically in energy consumption. A 70-18 percent majority want President Carter to recommend a bill that would 'impose a tough energy conservation program on both consumers and industry.'" Then an ABC News/Harris poll in March gave that trend a *dual* imprimatur: "Gnawing at the American people is a sense that as a nation we have been wasteful in our use of energy . . . by 92-6 percent most Americans think the public has been wasteful in our use of energy, 59 percent thinking we have been highly wasteful . . . by a unanimous 88-9 percent, most people think it is important that the country learn how to cut back on its use of energy. By 57-27 percent, a majority favor having President Carter 'impose a tough program of conservation on both consumers and industry.'" The ABC/Harris poll also detailed public majorities for conservation-minded schemes ranging from prohibiting sale of new cars that do not get 25 miles to the gallon to banning outdoor neon signs and converting plants and factories from oil and natural gas to coal. Granted, these findings came during the tail end of a severe winter,



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but even so, anyone in the White House reading the Harris data might be forgiven a bit for thinking that Americans were curled up in hair shirts awaiting a presidential call to energy sacrifice.

Mr. Carter's own pollster, Patrick Caddell, was more circumspect. The quarterly *Cambridge Report*, which is the major product of his survey company, does not deal in such blunt questions or bold numbers as Harris. And what exact advice Caddell gave the President, but did not put in print, can only be surmised.² A year earlier, in his *First Quarter 1976 Cambridge Report*, Caddell had indicated that trend data "point towards increased acceptance of anti-growth programs, particularly if they are aimed at conserving resources." The report added that "a full two-thirds of the American people believe that much of our economic activity produces superfluous goods and is, therefore, unnecessary itself."

By the spring of 1977, though, the *Cambridge Report* was coming up with slightly different findings. "Substantial public support for conservation" was also accompanied by "substantial public skepticism." Buried in Caddell's data was the information that a 48-42 plurality indicated that "conservation is not a realistic solution to the energy crisis unless we are all prepared to accept a much lower standard of living."


What's more, as Caddell and others noted, conservation had become the keystone of administration energy planning well before Mr. Carter's speeches in April, so the die was cast. And when Mr. Carter spoke out, it was in just that puritanical vein and spirit. Repeatedly, the President told the country of the need to cut back, to reduce, to slow down. His implication was clear: lifestyles and living patterns would have to change. Conservation was in, consumption was out. Not unnaturally, press coverage of the White House package also stressed its conservationist bent, and that emphasis—plus the relative deemphasis on expanding production—instantly colored the response of the general public. Within a week, perhaps sensing a miscalculation, Carter dropped his initial approach, insisting that living standards would not fall. But the image stuck.

George Gallup found that the public reaction was prompt—and negative. A special *Newsweek*/Gallup poll published in late April found that much of the program was warmly received until respondents were asked the following: "Some people think the Carter plan puts too much emphasis on conservation of energy and not enough on the development of new energy sources. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?" Gallup found that 59 percent agreed. That is, 59 percent thought that conservation was overemphasized.

² It is difficult to pin down Patrick Caddell's exact advisory role with respect to the energy program. He counsels Carter on public attitudes, and was doing so at the time the energy speech was drafted and the energy program emerged. The studies of his firm for commercial clients have also emphasized energy problems. An Associated Press story this January indicated that in 1977, Caddell conducted nearly a dozen surveys for the White House (via the Democratic National Committee), some of which touched on energy. That his data and analyses significantly influenced Carter seems highly probable, to say the least.

Only 30 percent disagreed. This contrasted sharply with the reassuring findings of Caddell's *Second Quarter 1977 Cambridge Report* which argued that "a plurality of Americans feel that Carter has struck a proper balance, though over a quarter agree with the charge that he has overemphasized conservation."

Other polls, however, soon confirmed the dubious reaction to Mr. Carter's proposals. Surveys by NBC News (see Figure 1) showed the public at first gave the President a 47-45 favorable rating for his handling of energy problems, but even by late spring, support began dropping off. Since then, it has fallen even more sharply, closely paralleling the drop in Mr. Carter's own approval ratings. In July, the *Atlanta Constitution* interviewed Gene Pokorny, a vice president of Caddell's survey organization, about the pitfalls of energy conservation. "You don't call for sacrifice," Pokorny said, "you call for acting on your economic self-interest . . . poor people and conservatives are especially fearful and potentially hostile to conservation."



Still, for nearly six months, public polls ignored the Achilles' heel of the Carter energy package that Gallup and Pokorny had identified. But in December 1977, Louis Harris finally bit the bullet. Announcing that President Carter now received a 52-40 negative rating on his energy program, Harris noted that "by 56-32 percent, people believe that the trouble with the Carter energy program is that 'it puts all the emphasis on conservation and very little on how to get new sources of energy.' This charge has been principally made in the Senate and by the President's Republican opposition. But the public seems to agree." Whatever happened to February's hair shirts and spring feelings that Mr. Carter had struck the proper balance?

So much for public willingness to embrace an energy politics of shared deprivation as opposed to renewed economic growth through development of new energy resources.

Strategic Miscalculation #2: Convincing the Public about the Reality of an Energy Crisis. To sell his energy conservation plan to Americans unsympathetic with puritanism and anti-materialist lifestyles, Mr. Carter

had to convince them that (a) conventional energy sources were running out, and therefore, (b) a genuine crisis was upon us, requiring personal sacrifice. Obviously, the White House thought that Mr. Carter could do that or it would never have resorted to language calling the plan "the moral equivalent of war" or asserting that it was the single most important problem of Mr. Carter's first term. A year later, however, it is clear the President has failed to rally a skeptical public, and he has long since abandoned his moral crusade.

This is not the place to lay out a technical analysis of how much oil or gas may be available to the United States. In terms of public perceptions, however, it is important that right on the heels of Mr. Carter's energy message, several studies contradicting Mr. Carter—some of them ignored or even ineffectually suppressed by the administration—surfaced in the press and cast doubt upon the President's assumptions about shortages. The arrival of Alaskan and North Sea oil, spurring a series of stories about an energy glut, further blunted the White House public relations drive. The President's arguments were also undercut by persisting belief that the oil companies were engaged in a conspiracy to withhold supplies. Before long, Mr. Carter's April talk began to seem extreme. In August of 1977, a CBS/New York Times poll asked this question: "President Carter has told us that we are running out of oil and natural gas. Do you think that things are as bad as the Presi-

in April of this year showed that the number of Americans who believe that the energy problem is "very serious," 41 percent, is exactly the same as a year earlier, before Mr. Carter spoke out. (see Figure 2)


In short, I would argue that by overstating the potential shortages of oil and gas, by underestimating the extent to which Americans are committed to developing new supplies, and by just plain misreading the public mood, the President never really had a chance in trying to rally support behind his energy plan.

Strategic Miscalculation #3: Overrating the Trust Element. Central to the Carterite strategy was the notion that public opinion on energy, being vague and inchoate, could be carried along by the political power of a popular, trusted President. A controversial energy program, it was thought, would be floated over the potentially rough legislative rapids of Capitol Hill by the accumulated floodwaters of Carter popularity and public willingness to take energy policy on trust from the new President. The trust issue was highlighted by Caddell in his *Cambridge Reports*. In late 1976, for example, he characterized energy attitudes as "more distrust than direction." By early 1977, Caddell was reporting that whereas only 12 percent of the public had put "a lot" of trust in the energy policies of Gerald Ford, a much larger number, 36 percent, were willing to put "a lot" of energy conservation trust in Jimmy Carter—making Carter more trusted, in fact, than any other source of information on energy. By sweeping away public cynicism, Carter would become America's energy messiah.

Thus, even as the chief executive himself was publicly speculating that his energy program would cost him 10-15 points in the polls, his aides quietly assumed he had enough popularity in the bank to do the job. Caddell's *Second Quarter 1977 Cambridge Report*, citing some negative public reaction to the energy program's contents, said "the only possible conclusion is that Americans are willing, at the moment, to accept a program, parts of which they dislike, because the President, whom they trust, asks them to."

The early polls were encouraging enough. *Newsweek/Gallup* polling found 40 percent of those sampled more favorable to Carter because of his energy proposals, while only 17 percent were less favorable. An ABC/Harris poll showed Mr. Carter's approval rating climbing from 66 percent to 69 percent. Other polls, however, soon cast doubt on the critical assumption that public trust would buoy Carter. In March, even before the President's energy message, NBC News found only 19 percent of those sampled saying you could trust the President "just about always." A sizable group was openly skeptical. Of greater significance, the 60-70 percent job approval levels of April and May were not nearly as stalwart as White House tacticians assumed.

And if the trust and esteem that Carterites counted on was somewhat exaggerated in May, then by late summer—after the Bert Lance debacle—Mr. Carter's



dent said?" Thirty-three percent said yes, they were; but 57 percent said no, they were not.

Unable to persuade people that supplies were running out, the President soon found that he could not convince them of an energy crisis either. Pat Caddell has recently asserted that the number of Americans who believe in the seriousness of the energy question has quadrupled since Mr. Carter took office. George Gallup, however, has taken more than a half dozen polls which belie that conclusion; his most recent poll

ratings were no help at all, having dropped much too low to provide a psychological steamroller for controversial programs. This aspect of the Carter miscalculation in energy strategy was perhaps the *most* basic, though *least* energy-related of them all—a massive overestimate of the President's ability to maintain leadership and credibility with an American electorate no longer prepared to credit PR imagery and rhetorical good intentions.

Thus, by fall and winter of 1977-1978, when the administration's energy program faced its critical hours, first in the Senate and then in a joint House-Senate conference, Mr. Carter's approval ratings had become a minus rather than a plus. His energy package was sliced up and repackaged accordingly.

Strategic Miscalculation #4: Making a Villain of Big Oil. During his 1970 gubernatorial campaign and to a lesser extent during his 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter displayed a tendency to attack the "interests." His populist feelings can only have been reinforced in 1976-1977 by what he saw in the polling reports of Pat Caddell. In its surveys of those years, the *Cambridge Report* put heavy and repeated emphasis upon intense public suspicions of the oil industry. The word "conspiracy" recurs again and again, and majorities are reported to believe that energy problems stem directly from company greed. In mid-1976, the report told its clients that a "plurality of Americans favor breaking up the big oil companies simply because it would reduce their influence in the nation's political and economic life." Even in early 1977, the report noted that by a lopsided 4-1 majority, the public believed in an oil company conspiracy to boost profits.

Once again we cannot be sure exactly what Mr. Caddell was saying to Mr. Carter in private, but it is reasonable to assume that he was reporting to him much the same thing as he was telling his other clients. It is also reasonable to believe that Mr. Carter agreed he might score plenty of political points by frontally assaulting the oil companies. How else can one explain his extraordinary attack of October 13, 1977, one of the strongest broadsides in recent presidential history: "... there is potential war profiteering in the impending energy crisis. This could develop with the passing months as the biggest ripoff in history . . . the oil companies apparently want it all."

The intriguing thing is that Mr. Carter's rebukes of the oil companies and energy interests do not seem to have worked. After the President fired his first volleys, his energy policy ratings charted by NBC News and elsewhere showed no gains. And several top oil company executives referred to private polls suggesting that Mr. Carter had hurt himself and his legislation. Clearly, he had won a flock of new political enemies in the producing states.

Meanwhile, the White House may also have ignored a significant, though little noticed shift in public

and elite opinion. A number of pollsters—Roper, Harris et al.—have reported somewhat improving attitudes toward major corporations in 1977-1978, and there's good reason to think this trend carries over to oil companies. A 1977 survey of leaders in the media, the Congress and the regulatory fields by Michael Rowen (albeit for Mobil Oil Corporation) shows that the attitudes of these "opinion makers" became much less hostile and more favorable toward the oil companies between 1973 and 1977. That is probably true, and a related point is made by Louis Banks, a Harvard Business School professor and former editor of *Fortune*, in the *Harvard Business Review* of March/April 1978:

Observers noted with interest that President Carter's bruising attack on the major oil companies, made during the heat of Congressional debate over his energy program, won remarkably few editorial plaudits. In fact, many papers and network shows checked with oil company sources and gave equal play to industry responses. "This awareness that there might be another side never would have happened three years ago," (Mobil Vice President Herbert) Schmertz says, and most industry spokesmen agree with him.

In short, Mr. Carter's attacks on the energy producers were yet another dimension—we are now on Number Four—of the way that the administration misread American opinion.

Strategic Miscalculation #5: Public Attitudes toward Natural Gas. It is very easy to sum up poll findings on the issue of deregulating the price of new natural gas. In a nutshell, everything depends on the way the question is phrased. As a result, polls on deregulation are—literally—all over the lot, and there is little point here in merely parading their phraseological and statistical contradictions.

One key point deserves to be made, however. Most pollsters found public opinion on deregulation either closely divided or even favorable. Various phrased questions by Louis Harris found attitudes on natural gas deregulation ranging from 55-27 favorable (March 1977) to 40-38 negative (February 1977). But, Carter pollster Pat Caddell produced repeated surveys showing the public strongly *opposed* to deregulation. No other

Table 1
DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS

Question: Do you favor or oppose each of the following measures?

	End Price Controls on Natural Gas		
	Favor	Don't Know	Oppose
Third Quarter 1976	27%	22%	51%
Fourth Quarter 1976	25	23	52
First Quarter 1977	29	16	55

Source: *Cambridge Reports*, latest that of 1st Quarter, 1977.

national poll produced such a steady flow of anti-deregulation data. Table 1 shows the 1976-1977 findings of the *Cambridge Report*.

It is tempting to suggest that these Caddell data are fully in tandem with Mr. Carter's own biases (I read his deregulation pledge in the autumn of 1976 as an election-hour ploy aimed at securing the electoral votes of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana, not a declaration of policy). At any rate, in slamming deregulation as a "rip-off" once he became President, Mr. Carter seems to have misjudged public opinion once again. If one believes the Caddell data, then voters/consumers opposed to deregulation could have been expected to pressure Congress into supporting the President's pro-regulation program. In point of fact, the lack of public response one way or the other was more in keeping with the closer division of opinion reported by other pollsters.

Thus, Mr. Carter's assumptions about public opinion once again proved counterproductive. In the face of divided public attitudes, natural gas interests had the leverage to obtain much more favorable legislation than the President hoped or anticipated. Politically, Mr. Carter also found himself in an awkward corner. At first, as he tried to insist upon his ideological, populist position, the public saw that he could not work his will upon the Congress. Then in early 1978, as he changed position again—this time to accommodate the deregulation forces—he left his original congressional allies sputtering with rage while he chipped away at his strongest political asset, his *personal* standing with the American people.

Strategic Miscalculation #6: Failure to Recognize a Growing Tax Revolt. From the beginning, the Carter program was largely a tax-and-conservation effort with new taxes serving as a vehicle not only for conservation but for income redistribution.

The very limited extent to which draftsmen of this administration's energy program initially consulted with tax experts has been widely noted; fewer critics have discussed the minimal political consciousness which seemed to backstop the program. Apparently little thought was ever given to the changing political landscape of taxation—not only to the social security increase just over the horizon, but also to the rising sentiment against taxes apparent across the land. Nor did it help when some administration spokesmen indicated that oil tax receipts might be used to fund welfare programs.³ Republicans promptly attacked the energy programs as a disguised means of raising welfare money and balancing the Carter budget, two charges that cast the energy taxes in a very unpopular light.

In specific terms, Mr. Carter's gasoline tax was

opposed by the public from the beginning, while opinion fluctuated on the gas-guzzler levy. Throughout most of 1977, Harris and other pollsters generally reported a majority of Americans favoring the tax on crude oil. But then came the congressional decision to legislate an enormous ten-year increase in social security taxes. That, plus the rising burden of property taxes throughout much of the country, ignited what soon earned the description of a "tax revolt." Within a few months of passing the social security hike, a number of congressmen and senators were trying to backtrack. As for the administration's crude oil levy, with its additional burden of taxation and inflation, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long pronounced it unworkable by March of 1978.

Throughout 1977, relatively few pollsters probed overall public feelings toward the next taxes that were so vital to the President's energy program.⁴ Finally in December, Louis Harris asked the question directly. And a 61-20 percent majority agreed that "What was wrong with President Carter's original energy program was that it would have meant a big increase in taxes on energy to try to get people and industry to use less energy." Put that together with the 56-32 majority feeling that the Carter program erred in putting "all the emphasis on conservation," and you have a strong public rejection of the twin conceptual pillars of the administration's energy package.

In at least six major respects, then, the White House misjudged public opinion while planning its energy program. Granted this is but a single chapter in a strategic chronicle of the energy bill; historians attempting a full overview will have to weigh a multitude of other factors, ranging from the deployment of lobbyists and the early ineptitude of the White House congressional relations staff to the politics of coal. But the role of public opinion deserves more attention than it has received.

Had the American people reacted favorably to Mr. Carter's energy program and pressed Congress for its enactment, the package would have cleared Capitol Hill almost in toto. The public did not react enthusiastically, however, because major elements of that program were at odds with majority viewpoints on matters so fundamental to American politics as growth *versus* energy conservation, production incentives *versus* income redistribution, and on the relative role of federal regulation. Simply put, James Earl Carter and John Q. Public have not been seeing the same crisis—or the same solutions. □

³ In April, then-OMB Director Bert Lance told Atlanta journalists that the energy package "is part of welfare reform and tax reform in the broadest context of those words because if you don't do it on that sort of basis, you miss the opportunity to deal with the problems of the poor and disadvantaged." He was echoing comments also made by Jim Schlesinger, the President's chief energy adviser.

⁴ While the Gallup organization did not ask people directly whether the Carter energy program relied too heavily upon taxes, Gallup vice president Jay Schmiedeskamp testified before the Joint Economic Committee on June 22, 1977 that the public perceived energy prices/taxes as part of the problem, not part of the solution. "Clearly people want strong action to solve the problem, just so long as high energy prices or increased energy taxes can be avoided. Because high prices and/or taxes are the problem in the public view." *Assessment of Public Opinion and Public Expectations Concerning the Government and the Economy*, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, June 22, 1977, p. 44.

American Opinion on Shifting Sands

by Andrew Kohut

Whatever their diplomatic consequences, the stunning series of events in the Middle East over the past six months has revealed that American public support for Israel may be much more fragile than once imagined.

For many years, sympathy for Israel has been one of the givens of U.S. public opinion, a "constant" that has played an important role not only in national politics but in national policy making. In recent weeks, however, there has been a significant erosion in that support which leaves many unanswered questions about the future.

Perhaps the best measure of changing attitudes is provided by a question that the Gallup poll has asked over the past decade of Americans who say they have heard of the Mideast conflict (usually about 75 percent of the population). The question has been this: "In the Mideast situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?"

As Figure 1 points out, the ratio of preference for Israel over the past decade has ranged from about 10 to 1 just after the Six Day War of 1967 to a low of about 5 to 1 (in March 1970 and again in October of 1977). Immediately after President Sadat's trip to Israel, the Gallup survey asked the same question and found that the visit had not yet had an impact on American sympathies. That December measurement, as compared to the previous October (before the trip), showed an increase in the number saying they sympathized with neither side (22 percent to 28 percent), but basic loyalties remained almost as they had been.


In late February of this year, however, a *Newsweek*/Gallup survey indicated that a major shift might be under way. For the first time since 1967, sympathies for Israel were rapidly dropping (from 46 percent in October to 33 percent in February). Polls by the Roper Organization confirmed the trend: Roper found that between March of 1977 and January 19, 1978, basic sympathy for Israel dropped from 43 percent to 37 percent, while sympathy for the Arabs increased from 5 percent to 10 percent.

It is important to underscore the point that as of early spring, the Gallup surveys still showed that far more Americans were sympathetic toward the Israelis

than toward the Arabs. In fact, an early March poll by Gallup showed a slight rebounding in support for Israel (38 percent expressed basic sympathy for Israel compared to 11 percent for the Arab states). After Israel's incursion into Lebanon, Louis Harris found that only 10 percent of all Americans thought Israel should give up all of the occupied territories, while 50 percent said Israel should give back some of it but keep "what it needs to protect its security." The Roper Organization has come up with fairly similar results. A more recent poll, relased by Louis Harris in early May, showed that opposition to selling more arms to Israel was almost as intense as opposition to Arab sales: President Carter's proposed plane sales to Israel were opposed by a 64-28 percent majority; to Egypt, 71-20; and to Saudi Arabia, 73-18. All of these surveys confirm that there is still a deep reservoir of affection and support for Israel in the United States. By the same token, however, *the 13 point slide in sympathy for Israel over a six-month period cannot be lightly dismissed: it is the sharpest, deepest and fastest drop that the Gallup survey has ever found with regard to the Middle East.*

Stability of Support in the Past

America's strong leaning toward Israel in preceding years is not open to doubt. Summarizing their comprehensive study of U.S. attitudes in the November 1977



issue of *Commentary*, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider put it this way: "The record seems clear. By whatever measure or question one uses, and whatever opinion poll one consults, American sympathy for Israel has remained relatively constant since 1967, and many more Americans have been supportive of Israel than of the Arabs."

In those years between 1967 and 1977, there was an ebb and flow in basic sympathy toward Israel depending on the political climate in the Middle East. In contrast to more recent months, however, American sympathy for Israel increased during periods of crisis and then decreased as the Mideast situation cooled down.

This fluctuation, incidentally, has not been characteristic of attitudes toward the Arab countries in previous years. Since the Six Day War, there has been a small but steadily growing number of Americans who identify themselves as having basic sympathies with the Arab nations. Even at the time of the oil embargo,

the percentage of Arab sympathizers did not decrease. By late 1977, about 10 percent of the Gallup sample regarded themselves as sympathetic to the Arab nations, a number that was twice as large as the support that existed a decade earlier. Nonetheless, as of November 1977—just before President Sadat announced his trip to Jerusalem—support for Israel remained roughly five times more prevalent than support for the Arab nations.

Similarly, various surveys have shown that the American public has consistently held a more positive attitude toward Israel's commitment to peace than it has toward the Arabs' position. For example, as recently as October 1977, a Harris poll found that 55 percent of the public rated the Israelis as "really wanting peace," compared to 37 percent who said the same of Egypt.

Historically, Israeli leaders have also won high marks with the American public. Golda Meir in her tenure as Israel's prime minister was time and again

Further Commentary on American Attitudes

In an article published in the November 1977 issue of *Commentary*, which Mr. Kohut quotes on these pages, William Schneider and I concluded from our examination of U.S. opinion polls on the Middle East from 1948 to 1977 that a sizable number of Americans were so deeply committed to Israel's side in the conflict that a confrontation between the United States and Israel would politically damage the Carter administration. We said then: "Israel is fervently backed by a politically potent minority (one we estimated as about 25 percent), including a large number of non-Jews, who are prepared to punish at the ballot box those who seek to undermine the unique American-Israeli relationship."

Since that article appeared, the Sadat visit to Jerusalem and its aftermath have changed the larger context within which people perceive the Middle East situation. There is no question that the pattern of declining support for Israel and of greater approval for Sadat's role than for Begin's in the negotiation process, as reported by Mr. Kohut, is accurate. But it is not entirely surprising, either. In past years, much of the support voiced for Israel to questions asking people whether they sympathize more with Israel or the Arabs has clearly been soft. Many of those who said they sympathized with Israel would go on in the same surveys to oppose military aid for the Jewish state. It is not unnatural, therefore, that some of those same people no longer voice a preference for Israel in the current situation, or that the always small pro-Arab figure has moved up slightly.

Yet the data from the various cross-sectional surveys do not tell us how the deeply committed pro-

Israel segment is reacting. There is some evidence, in fact, that the 25-percent hard-core support for Israel remains firm. In March of this year, the Harris survey asked: "If it came down to it and there was a disagreement between Egypt and Israel on a peace settlement in the Middle East, whom would you trust more, Egypt or Israel?" Forty-three percent said Israel, 24 percent said Egypt and 33 percent were not sure. In a poll taken in early April, the New York Times-CBS News poll asked the argumentative question: "Some people think the United States should pay more attention to the Arabs, even if it means antagonizing Israel, while other people think the U.S. should give its strongest support to Israel, even if it means risking an Arab oil boycott. If these were the only two choices, what should the U.S. do—pay more attention to the Arabs, or give our strongest support to Israel?" Even when presented with the dire prospect of another oil boycott, Americans by a plurality of 43 percent to 29 said the United States should support Israel rather than pay more attention to the Arabs.

Stability in popular reaction to the future of the territories, before and after Sadat's visit, is also reflected in the Roper Organization's surveys. In a series of five polls taken from December 1973 to January 1978, Roper has presented respondents with four options. There has been little change in people's choices over the years. The percentage saying Israel should keep all the territory it won fell from 16 percent in June 1977, its high point in the five surveys, to 12 percent in January of this year. Those saying Israel should yield all the territories have not varied, remaining at 6-7 percent in all five polls. In the most recent survey,

named one of the most admired women by Americans who were queried in the end of the year Gallup poll; she even came in first in 1971, 1973 and 1974. Over that same period there was little evidence of positive attitudes toward leaders of other Mideast nations.

The one group in this country whose sympathies have sharply diverged from the rest of the public during the past decade has been the nonwhite population. Between 1967 and 1977, there was a fourfold increase among nonwhites in sympathies for the Arab nations and a significant decrease in support for Israel. By late 1977, among those nonwhites who expressed sympathy for either side, support was divided almost equally with 20 percent siding with Israel and 22 percent with the Arabs.

Two Sources of Change

There appear to have been two major factors that have caused the shift in U.S. attitudes in recent weeks. First and perhaps most importantly, President Anwar Sadat's

daring initiatives quickly earned him the personal admiration of many Americans.

Public response to Sadat's peace overture was immediate. An NBC News poll conducted between November 20-30 of 1977, just as Sadat's trip to Jerusalem ended, showed that 66 percent of the U.S. public felt that Sadat was doing an excellent or good job in negotiating for peace in the Middle East. In the same survey, Menachem Begin was positively rated by significantly fewer people (49 percent), as was President Carter (45 percent).

The breakdown of peace negotiations in January took some toll on Sadat's popularity. NBC repeated its ratings of Mideast leaders in late February and found that Sadat's positive rating had declined from 66 to 56 percent. Positive ratings for Begin, however, had plummeted even further to 29 percent. A *Newsweek*/Gallup survey conducted in that period employed the same rating scale but asked respondents to rate the principals in terms of "trying to achieve peace." Both the Egyptian

by Seymour Martin Lipset



however, a quarter of those interviewed took a soft intermediate position that "Israel should give up all or most of the territory she has taken in the last two wars—but only if a satisfactory treaty can be negotiated with the Arabs that will guarantee her existence as a state." And more than a third of the respondents, 36 percent, chose the hard intermediate position: "It is time for Israel to make *some* concessions, but it is important that she keep what territory is essential for her defense." This last position was the most frequently chosen in all five polls. If one combines the two harder-line positions, there is almost no difference between the aggregates before and after the Sadat visit: 50 percent supported the harder-line positions in June 1977, 48 percent continued to support them in January 1978.

The survey data gathered since the Sadat visit clearly do not challenge our conclusion, written in late October for *Commentary*, that "the only 'veto group' in the American electorate concerned with the Middle East is composed of those dedicated to the survival of Israel. This group . . . has been ready to bombard Congressmen and the administration with letters, telegrams, phone calls, and personal visits to present their case. . . . (T)hey will vote against those who oppose Israel, a fact of which officeholders are well aware." The strength of this "veto-group" may be reflected in Harris polls which have asked: "How would you rate the job President Carter has done on working for a peace settlement in the Middle East—excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor?" In polls taken in December 1977 and January 1978, majorities gave the President positive ratings: 63 percent in December and

57 percent in January. By February, however, his support had fallen to 46 percent, and in a survey at the end of March 1978, only 44 percent gave him a positive rating (excellent and pretty good) on his Middle East activities, compared to 48 percent who were negative (only fair and poor).

Positive evaluations of "the way Carter is handling his job as President" are also way down in all the polls. The most recent Gallup, Harris and NBC surveys report considerably less than 50 percent approval rates. How much fall-off in support for Carter is related to negative feelings about his Middle East activities or foreign policy generally is anyone's guess. Inflation and the growing impression that he is inept as a leader are probably the most important factors. Still the fact that the Jews, proverbially the most intensely Democratic white group, now are more prone to voice negative judgments to pollsters about the President's performance in office than others suggests that his Middle East policies are hurting him.

Leaders of Congress can read the state of public opinion and know a veto-group when they see one. Hence, the public recommendation to the President, issued by Tip O'Neill and other leaders on April 24, that he forget about sending up the linked proposal for planes for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel, an idea that supporters of Israel bitterly oppose. As this was written, some observers felt the President was finally showing greater flexibility. Perhaps someone reminded him on that Camp David weekend that politics remains the art of the possible.



and Israeli leaders received higher ratings for trying than for negotiating, but the rank order was still the same: Sadat 65 percent positive, Begin 41 percent.

The early NBC polls suggest that Sadat was given credit for initiating the peace efforts. The recent polls suggest, however, that Begin has been given more credit for its collapse.

The second major factor in changing American attitudes, one that was fortified and reinforced by positive attitudes toward Sadat, has been a growing sense in this country that Egypt is more conciliatory in the peace negotiations than Israel. In a December survey by NBC News, prior to the breakdown of the peace talks and establishment of the new Israeli settlements, 52 percent of the telephone sample reported that the Arabs should make more concessions to the Israelis, while slightly fewer, 45 percent, felt the Israelis should make more concessions to the Arabs. A month later, however, 56 percent reported that some or quite a lot of concessions had been made by Egypt while only 46 percent felt Israel had made concessions (NBC News, January 10).

A *Newsweek*/Gallup survey of late February addressed the issue head-on with the question: "Which country has been most willing to compromise?" The results were quite dramatic: 45 percent of the sample said that Egypt was the most willing to compromise while only 26 percent cited Israel. Thus, within less than three months, American public opinion had been reversed: in early December, the public felt it was more incumbent upon the Egyptians to compromise than the Israelis; by early 1978, Egypt was viewed as much more conciliatory.

In turn, Egypt—unlike Arab countries in general—has improved its position with the American public quite substantially. In a question series which asked respondents directly whether their sympathies had changed, 42 percent reported in late February that they were more sympathetic toward Egypt than a year earlier, and only 20 percent were less sympathetic. Consistent with the long-term trend, reports of less sympathy for Israel outweighed reports of more sympathy by 34 percent versus 27 percent.

Israeli Intransigence—Is That the Key?

Further analysis of the *Newsweek*/Gallup data gives some clues as to which of these factors most influenced the change in American sympathies. Cross tabulations from the late February survey show that the greatest loss in sympathy for Israel was among those who thought that Egypt was more willing to compromise; the second greatest loss came from those who gave fair or poor ratings to Begin, while the third greatest loss came from those who gave high marks to Sadat. Conversely, the greatest gain in sympathy for Egypt was among those who thought Egypt was more willing to compromise, while the second greatest gain for Egypt came from those who gave Sadat high marks. Ratings of Begin seemed to make little difference in increasing support for Egypt. Thus, the single most important factor in accounting for a shift of American views was the perception that Israel was the more intransigent in peace negotiations.

One point that is less clear is why the American public has reacted as strongly as it has to what it defines as Israeli intransigence. Some Israelis blame the Carter administration: they argue that their government put forward a positive, forthcoming negotiating plan that was welcomed at first by the Americans but then, in order to please the Arabs, was recast by President Carter as a negative obstacle to peace. The administration, of course, disagrees. Whatever the merits of the dispute may be, it appears that the change in U.S. public opinion runs deeper than the way the Israelis have been characterized by Mr. Carter. In past years, when Americans have rallied to the side of the Israelis, Americans have typically viewed Israel as an embattled nation surrounded by hostile neighbors. Israel was perceived to be a victim—a victim not only of Palestinian terrorist attacks but of the holocaust. This perception has been sharply challenged, however, by the impression that Israel is now resisting major territorial concessions and is even expanding its border settlements. The emergence of Sadat as the peace seeker, the man who is trying harder, also conflicts with the idea that Israel is beset on all sides by potential aggressors.

In summary, Israel still holds a more affectionate place in American hearts than do the Arab nations, but sympathies here are much less pronounced than they were only a few months ago. Whether the tide could easily turn again in Israel's favor is one of many unanswered questions. Perhaps a more flexible bargaining proposal by Israel or perhaps a period of sustained Palestinian attacks would turn the tables; no one knows. It is also unclear whether Sadat's personal popularity, which has raised the standing of the Egyptians in American eyes, will one day rub off on the other Arab nations. So far, that hasn't happened. But the events of recent months have shown that American attitudes toward the Middle East are open to change, and that in itself may be of enduring importance in international diplomacy. ☑



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In Israel, Back to Square One

by Louis Guttman


JERUSALEM—While President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem remains a fresh and vibrant memory among many Jewish Israeli citizens, one of the most striking features of Israel today is that public attitudes have returned to positions held long before the peace talks opened with Egypt.

In some areas the opening of peace talks with Egypt at first caused a seismic change in Israeli opinion; in other areas, the needle hardly flickered on the opinion dials. *But the important point is that within 60 days of Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, Israeli confidence in Egypt began to evaporate and attitudes were returning to what they had been for almost a decade before.* It was in this context that Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his cabinet began facing up to the events of the spring—the terrorist raid on Israeli civilians, Israel's incursion into Lebanon, Begin's chilly trip to Washington, and the aftermath in Israel.

The observations recorded here are based upon a Continuing Survey of Social Problems conducted since just before the Six Day War by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and by the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. As of this writing (mid-April, 1978) over 120,000 interviews have been carried out, sometimes bi-weekly, providing one of the most systematic and detailed studies of public opinion anywhere in the world. The interviews have been conducted in the homes of Jewish adults residing in Israel's larger cities (Jerusalem, greater Tel Aviv, greater Haifa, and Beersheba). Upon occasion, cross-sections of Jewish inhabitants of smaller places have also been studied, and on issues discussed here, there has been little variation between urban and rural views.

Egypt's Credibility: Its Rise and Fall

Initially, as we have seen, President Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem in mid-November sparked an equally dramatic reaction in opinion toward Egypt and toward the prospects of peace. In the ten years between the Six Day War of 1967 and the Sadat visit of 1977, the num-



ber of Jewish Israelis who thought that Egypt really wanted peace varied between 40-60 percent, depending on events. In the two days prior to the visit, positive Israeli attitudes jumped to over 80 percent and then immediately after the visit, rose even further to 90 percent. It was one of the steepest increases in the history of Israeli polling, comparable to those caused by the Six Day War and the Entebbe rescue operation.

The radically changed attitude toward Egypt also rubbed off on attitudes toward other Arab countries. As opposed to the 20-40 percent minority who believed that Arab countries as a whole were interested in genuine peace with Israel during the 1967-1977 period, over 80 percent assigned positive intentions to the Arab countries immediately after Sadat's journey. Syria was one of the few Arab nations still viewed negatively.

Even more remarkable than changing Israeli attitudes toward Egypt was the new hope for peace generated by the Sadat visit. Ever since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, only about 10 percent of the Israelis have thought that there would never be another war with Arab nations. The median estimate was usually that war would occur within three years of the time of each particular survey. As the Sadat visit became imminent, however, the proportion envisaging an end to all war jumped to 24 percent. On the Monday following Sadat's appearance at the Knesset—a speech televised all over Israel—the number believing that prospects of war had faded completely rose sharply to 54 percent. While second thoughts began to grow by that Wednesday, as the percent dropped to 32, the situation immediately after the visit was still radically different in the eyes of Israelis from that of the preceding four years.

In the weeks that immediately followed, Israeli attitudes toward Egypt and toward hopes for peace remained on a fairly high plateau. But then, as there were a series of pronouncements by Egyptians and others criticizing Prime Minister Begin's proposals for peace, positive Israeli attitudes began to crumble.

Sadat's decision to summon his political negotiating team back from Jerusalem in mid-January dealt a final, crushing blow to Israeli opinion: practically overnight, the percent of Israelis believing that Egypt wanted an acceptable peace plummeted to 53 percent while the number believing that peace was permanently at hand fell to 24 percent. Today, the number who foresee an end to war with the Arabs seems to have stabilized around 20 percent. *Thus, in a sense, it could be said that the second gambit of Sadat in Jerusalem almost wiped out the influence of the first—his dramatic appearance before the Knesset.*

It is worth noting that by visiting Jerusalem, Sadat did convince Israel's Jewry that he and Egypt wanted a real peace, but he did *not* induce euphoria. Israeli optimism was tempered by concern about behavior of the other Arab countries. It was also tempered by the Israelis' perception that the success of any leader depends on events as much as events depend upon any single

leader like Sadat. The Israelis believe that what may happen in Arab-Israeli relations may be outside the control of individual leaders, no matter how dominant those leaders appear to be. Accordingly, there was no deep feeling of letdown brought on by Sadat's disappointing behavior in the months that followed his visit. (It is a sad commentary on the accuracy of the reporting in the world—and even local—press that it produced stories of "euphoria" and then, "letdown," despite publicized research findings to the contrary.)

The Administered Territories

While Sadat's trip to Jerusalem stirred many Israeli hearts, his accompanying demand that Israel return to its 1967 borders made hardly a dent upon public attitudes. Indeed, in the diplomatic maneuvers that followed, there was a perceptible hardening in Israeli views.

Public attitudes toward the administered territories were largely formed in the days immediately following the 1967 war—a time when most Israelis were hardly even aware of what those areas were. The "Golan Heights" and "Sharm el-Sheikh" were only names in the news then. Most Israelis had never been anywhere near such places nor even heard of them before.

The one area that the Israeli public has shown a willingness to return over the past decade has been the Sinai peninsula, and the Sadat visit did manage to persuade still more Israelis of that view. Before the visit, about half to two-thirds of Jewish Israelis generally said they were prepared to relinquish the peninsula; after the visit, that number rose to over 85 percent and remained high even after Sadat withdrew his political team from Jerusalem in January.

Views on the Sinai are in sharp contrast, however, to those on other territories. Sharm el-Sheikh, for instance, holds a special place in the Israeli's perception of his security problems. Some softening in the consensus against returning Sharm el-Sheikh occurred with the Sadat visit, but the essential consensus remains today: about 75 percent still do not think that Sharm el-Sheikh should be returned to the Egyptians. Thoughts about the Golan Heights also have changed little over the years: over 80 percent of the Israeli Jewish population has consistently opposed their return to Syria and, with recent Syrian behavior regarded as intransigent, over 80 percent still oppose it. Similarly, there has been little change with regard to East Jerusalem. That portion of Jerusalem was in the hands of Jordan in the twenty years between the founding of the State of Israel and the Six Day War of 1967. Since that time there has been an overwhelming consensus among Israelis—over 75 percent—in favor of keeping East Jerusalem under sole Israeli control and not returning it or dividing the city again. That consensus is still solid today. Opposition to return of the Gaza Strip has been less intense, usually running between 60-80 percent, and the Egypt-


(Continued on page 57.)

OPINION ROUNDUP

The National Mood

FEAR OF INFLATION SPIRALS UPWARD

Question: A year from now, do you expect the prices of most things you buy will be rising more rapidly than a year ago, about as rapidly as they were then, rising but less rapidly than a year ago, staying the same, or are prices going down?




Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of March 20-21, 1978.

	More Rapidly	About as Rapidly	Less Rapidly	Same	Go Down	Not Sure
November 1974	30%	22%	21%	14%	4%	9%
January 1975	25	21	23	16	7	8
April 1975	17	18	21	21	9	14
May 1975	18	22	22	20	5	13
August 1975	23	29	22	16	2	8
November 1975	29	28	14	18	3	8
April 1976	20	32	14	22	3	9
August 1976	17	25	16	21	3	18
September 1976	17	25	16	21	3	18
November 1976	23	21	18	22	3	13
March 1977	35	34	10	12	1	8
July 1977	27	33	13	17	2	8
August 1977	27	32	16	15	3	7
September 1977	27	32	16	15	3	7
October 1977	34	33	9	14	2	8
February 1978	34	39	7	11	1	6
March 1978	37	30	15	8	2	8

Note: Question wording varied slightly in the March 1978 survey: "A year from now, do you think the prices of most things you buy will have gone up faster than they are now, as fast, up but not as fast, stayed the same or gone down?"

CONCERN FOR INFLATION SURPASSES UNEMPLOYMENT

Question: If you had to choose, which do you think is a more serious problem for the country today—rising prices or unemployment?



Note: † Response volunteered in 1975-1978 only.


Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of February 11-18, 1978.

Chart illustrations by H. Karlsson

OPINION ROUNDUP

LESS HAPPINESS . . . ?

Question: In general, how happy would you say you are—very happy, fairly happy, or not happy?




Note: Question wording varied slightly over the years. The most important differences occurred in the responses: in 1973, not happy="not at all happy"; in 1977, not happy="not too happy."

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of November 4-7, 1977.

. . . BUT MORE SATISFACTION?

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with each of the following? . . . Life in this country today.

Highly satisfied




* Respondents were handed a card and asked to indicate level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction on a scale of 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). The highly satisfied are those who chose levels 8-10.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of November 18-21, 1977.

GROWING NUMBER FORESEE U.S. AT WAR

Question: How likely is it that the United States will become involved in a war during the next three years? Would you say that it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all?



War is Likely

August 1977	35%
October	42
November	48
January 1978	42
March	51

Note: Likely=very likely and somewhat likely. In the latest poll, 19% of the respondents thought that war was "very likely," 32% said "somewhat likely."

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of March 21-22, 1978.



The question about the likelihood of war was originally asked by NBC News in August 1977, long before the Sadat peace initiative focused public attention on the troubled Mideast. Somewhat surprised by the relatively high public expectation of war, NBC repeated the question in October and November. At the same time, questions about the likely geographical location of any future wars were added.

Among those who have ventured opinions about where hostilities were likely to occur, the Mideast has been the predominant first choice—54 percent in October and 65 percent in November. As can be seen in the accompanying chart, the public perception that war was likely declined in January, coinciding with a hopeful period in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. But by March, with the well-publicized breakdown in those negotiations, the fear of war increased sharply to 51 percent, the highest level recorded since NBC News began measuring opinion on this question.

Dr. Sheldon Gawiser
Manager of Polling
NBC News

OPINION ROUNDUP

LOU HARRIS FINDS RISING ALIENATION



A NOTE TO READERS

The material in this section has been produced with the invaluable assistance of the Roper Center, the oldest and largest archive of sample survey data in the world and an affiliate of the University of Connecticut, Yale University and Williams College. The center's archives are open to qualified students of public opinion on a contractual basis. Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., who serves as a consultant in the preparation of this roundup, is the acting executive director of the center.

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/New York Times and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ± 3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

—The Editors

Question: I want to read you some things that people have felt from time to time. Do you tend to feel or not that (read list)?¹ Now I want to read you some things that some people have told us they have felt from time to time. Do you tend to feel that (read list)?²

	1966	1968	1971	1972	1973	1974	1976	1977
Rich get richer and poor get poorer.	45%	54%	62%	68%	76%	77%	76%	77%
Most people with power try to take advantage of people like yourself.								
What you think doesn't count much anymore.	37	42	44	53	61	54	62	61
People running the country don't really care what happens to you.	26	36	41	50	55	48	59	60
You feel left out of things around you.	9	12	20	25	29	32	40	35

Note: ¹ Question wording in 1966, 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1974.

² Question wording in 1976 and 1977.


Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of November 7-14, 1977.

Government and the Economy

PUBLIC PUTS EMPHASIS ON CONTROLLING INFLATION

Inflation vs. Tax Cut

Question: Please tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement. Controlling inflation is more important than cutting taxes. Would you say you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?




Note: Favor controlling inflation = agree strongly and agree; prefer tax cut = disagree and disagree strongly.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), January 3-15 and 20-26, 1978.

Inflation vs. Pay Hike

Question: Let's say you were up for a raise in pay. How would you feel about these two situations? One would be your getting a pay increase lower than the cost of living but with some assurance the cost of living were being brought under control. The other situation would be your getting a pay increase higher than the cost of living but with no assurance the cost of living were being brought under control. Which would you choose?



Note: Favor controlling inflation = pay increase lower than cost of living, with assurance of controlling cost of living; prefer large pay hike = pay increase higher than cost of living, no assurance of controlling cost of living.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, February 11-18, 1978.

WHO BENEFITS FROM CARTER TAX CUTS?

Question: Of these groups, low-income people, high-income people, middle-income people, businesses and people like yourself, which do you feel would benefit the most? (Question refers to President

Carter's tax cut proposal.)

Nationwide results: low-income people benefit the most, 29%; middle-income people benefit the most, 18%; high-income people benefit the most, 18%; high-income people benefit the most, 33%; busi-


nesses benefit the most, 18%; people like yourself benefit the most, 3%.

Note: Income = annual family income.



Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), January 20-26, 1978.

WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS: A POLL TO WATCH



Favor Wage-Price Controls?

WHO GETS THEIR JUST DESERTS?

The fact that over 90% of the people think that someone else, not people like themselves, will benefit most from the tax cut is perfectly natural and understandable, once you grasp what "benefit" means. If "benefit" was an objective fact, measurable in dollars of tax reduction or percentage of tax reduction, the answers would be paradoxical. But "benefit" means amount of tax reduction *relative to my just deserts*. A tax reduction that is less than my just deserts is not a benefit, but an insult. And, of course, no one ever thinks he gets his just deserts. This helps to explain why tax reduction is politically a loser and why, therefore, we get so little tax reduction despite the large increase of revenues generated by economic growth and inflation. One would expect tax reduction to be popular, and so it is, when considered in general terms. But every specific tax bill makes more enemies than friends, because everyone thinks he got less than he deserved while others got more.

—Herbert Stein
AEI Adjunct Scholar

	Favor/ Approve/ Good/ Yes	Oppose/ Dis- approve/ Poor/ No	No Opin- ion		Favor/ Approve/ Good/ Yes	Oppose/ Dis- approve/ Poor/ No	No Opin- ion
August-September 1941	62%	32%	6%	October 1966	33	51	16
September 1941	66	28	6	January 1968	46	43	11
November-December 1941	63	28	9	June 1969	47	41	12
March 1942	66	24	10	May 1970	48	41	11
September 1942	83	11	6	February 1971	49	38	13
August 1945	77	18	5	June 1971	50	39	11
October 1945	67	21	12	August 15, 1971 Strict controls placed	68	11	12
November-December 1946	49	43	8	April 30, 1974 Nixon removed all controls	50	39	11
June 1951	65	16	19	August 1974	50	39	11
December 1952	61	29	10	December 1976	44	41	15
August 1958	47	43	10	February 10-13, 1978	44	40	16
May-June 1959	44	42	14	April 14-17, 1978	50	39	11
May 1962	40	46	14				
December 1965-January 1966	45	42	13				
April 1966	42	44	14				

Note: Responses were: September 1942, Favor and Qualified Approval = Favor; August 1945 and October 1945, Keep both = Favor, Do away with both = Oppose; June 1951, Continued plus Strengthened = Favor, Done away with = Oppose; December 1952, Continue = Favor, Abolish = Oppose.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of April 14-17, 1978.

See next page for questions

OPINION ROUNDUP

REGULATION VS. FREE ENTERPRISE



Question: The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.

	Agree	Disagree	No Opinion
1964	42%	39%	19%
1978	58	31	11
By Political Ideology (1978):			
Liberal	45	43	12
Middle-of-road	58	33	9
Conservative	67	25	8

Source: Surveys by Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967) for 1964; CBS News/New York Times, January 8-12, 1978.

GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS DRAW MIXED REVIEWS

Question: I'm going to name some of the ways government regulates things it thinks might be harmful. I'd like to know if you think the government should regulate these things or if it should leave decisions up to individuals.



	Government	Factory
Should government set safety standards and require changes in job conditions if it thinks they are harmful, or should each factory set its own rules	72%	28%

	Restrict Sale	Let People Decide
What about handguns? Should government restrict the sale of handguns, or should adults be able to buy any gun they feel they need?	61	39

What about marijuana? Should the government restrict the sale of marijuana if it thinks it is dangerous, or should it warn people and let them make their own decisions?

By Age:	Restrict Sale	Let People Decide
18-29	40	60
30-44	57	43
45-64	71	29
Over 65	68	32

Should the government restrict the sale of foods and drugs that it thinks are dangerous, or should it warn people and let them make their own decision?

48 52

What about pornography? Should government, at some level, restrict the sale of pornography to adults, or should adults be permitted to buy and read whatever they wish?

44 56

By Political Ideology:

	Restrict Sale	Let People Decide
Liberal	32	68
Middle-of-road	41	59
Conservative	49	51

The government has been studying the possible effects of the artificial sweetener saccharin. Should the government restrict the sale of saccharin if it thinks it is dangerous, or should it warn people and let them make their own decisions?

29 71

	Restrict Sale	Let People Decide
Users of saccharin	22	78
Non-users of saccharin	34	66

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, January 8-12, 1978.

QUESTIONS: WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS

Questions

August-September 1941
As one way to prevent prices from going up rapidly, would you be willing to have the government keep your salary rate where it now is, if the government also keeps the prices of the things you buy where they are now?

September 1941
As one way to prevent prices from going up rapidly, would you be willing to have the government keep your wage (salary) rate where it is now, if the government also keeps the prices of the things you buy where they are now?

November-December 1941
A new law in Canada keeps wages and salaries from going higher than they are now, and also keeps all prices, including prices of farm products, from going higher. Would you approve or disapprove of such a law in the United States?

March 1942
A law in Canada keeps wage and salary rates from going higher than they are now, and also keeps all prices, including prices of farm products, from going higher. Would you approve or disapprove of such a law in the United States?

September 1942
To keep the cost of living from going higher, do you favor or oppose wage-price controls?

August 1945, October 1945
Some people believe that wage ceilings cannot be removed without also removing price ceilings. If you had to vote for or against keeping both wage and price controls, would you vote to keep both or do away with both?

November-December 1946
Would you be willing to keep wages where they are now provided that prices remain where they are now?

June 1951
Do you think the federal price and wage control

laws should be continued as they are, or strengthened, or done away with?

December 1952
Federal price and wage control laws end April 30 [1953]. Do you think these laws should be continued after this date, or do you think they should be done away with?

August 1956
Would you favor laws which would keep both prices and wages at their present level?

May-June 1959
Would you favor or oppose laws which would keep both prices and wages at their present level?

May 1962
It has been suggested that both prices and wages be kept from going any higher. This means that wages couldn't go up, and prices couldn't go up. Would you favor or oppose this?

December 1965-January 1966, April 1966, October 1966, January 1968, June 1969, May 1970

It has been suggested that prices and wages (salaries) be frozen—that is, kept at their present level, as long as the war in Vietnam lasts. Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?

February 1971, June 1971
It has been suggested that prices and wages be frozen—that is, kept at their present level, as long as the war in Vietnam lasts. Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?

August 1971
As you know, the President has "frozen" prices, wages and rent for 90 days. Do you approve or disapprove of this move? (Only asked of those who had heard or read about President Nixon's new economic program, which he presented to the nation=91%.)

August 1974, December 1976, February 1978, April 1978
Would you favor or oppose having the government bring back wage and price controls?

OPINION ROUNDUP

U.S. NEWS EXPLORES BUSINESS-RELATED ATTITUDES


Presented here are some of the more interesting findings from the second annual Study of American Opinion, sponsored by the Marketing Department of *U.S. News and World Report*. The study was conducted from October to December 1977, and explores public attitudes toward business, government, labor, and a host of other institutions and issues; it is unusual in its effort to tap opinions of government officials and business executives, as well as those of household heads.

This mail survey was conducted by Marketing Concepts, Inc., a Washington D.C. research consulting firm; no mention was

made in the questionnaire of *U.S. News'* sponsorship. The household head sample was drawn from commercial lists of households having a telephone and owning at least one car. A business executive sample was compiled from *Standard and Poor's Register*; the government official sample from the *Congressional Directory* included top elected and appointed officials in all three branches of government. Some 5,873 household heads responded, a return rate of 52%; 63%, or 1,870, of the business executives replied to the questionnaire, as did 32%, or 740, of the government officials.

Question: For each of the statements listed below, would you please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement? (Possible responses: strongly agree, mildly agree, no opinion, mildly disagree, strongly disagree.)

Note: Agree = strongly agree and mildly agree



Keeping inflation under control is necessary even if it results in higher unemployment

Balanced federal budget essential, even if it means lower government benefits or higher taxes

Cost to taxpayers of regulating business is well worth it

The more government regulation there is, the less efficiently companies can operate

Large companies have a major influence on the government agencies regulating them



Government regulation is the best way to ensure safe products

Competition is better than government regulation to make sure that the public gets what it pays for


New federal agency should be set up as "voice of the consumer"

Government should require ultimate in product safety standards, regardless of cost



Inflation



Business and regulation



Consumerism





Source: Mail survey by Marketing Concepts, Inc. of Washington, D.C., October-December 1977. Sponsored by the Marketing Department of *U.S. News and World Report*. (See note above.)

WHO WOULD YOU BELIEVE IN AN ENERGY CRISIS?

Question: If a sudden new energy problem were to come up and differing reasons for its cause were given by business, by en-

vironmentalists and by the government, which of these three groups would you be most likely to believe?



Source: Mail survey by Marketing Concepts, Inc. of Washington, D.C., October-December 1977. Sponsored by the Marketing Department of *U.S. News and World Report*. (See note above.)

Avis of Superpowers?

U.S. POWER SEEN ON THE WANE


Question: How do you think the military strength of the United States compares to that of Russia—is the U.S. much stronger than Russia, is the U.S. somewhat stronger than Russia, are both about equal, is the U.S. somewhat weaker than Russia, or is the U.S. much weaker than Russia?

	1976	1978
U.S. is stronger	29%	20%
Both are equal	30	36
U.S. is weaker	27	34
No opinion	14	10

Note: Stronger=much stronger and somewhat stronger; weaker=somewhat weaker and much weaker.

Sample for 1976 survey was 502 respondents; sample for 1978 was 1,015 respondents.


Source: Surveys by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, latest that of February 21-28, 1978. Sponsored by the Institute of American Relations in Washington, D.C.



SALT: WOULD RUSSIANS ABIDE BY AN AGREEMENT?

Question: If the United States and Russia sign an agreement to limit the number and spread of strategic weapons, do you think

(Russia; the United States) will live up to its part of the agreement?



Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, February 21-28, 1978. Sponsored by the Institute of American Relations in Washington, D.C.

SHOULD THE U.S. BE STRONGER THAN RUSSIA?

Question: Do you think the United States, in its military strength, should be superior to Russia, should be about equal to Russia, or should be inferior to Russia?

United States should be superior	52%
About equal	45
United States should be inferior	3

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, February 21-28, 1978. Sponsored by the Institute of American Relations in Washington, D.C.

OPINION ROUNDUP

It will not be the style of *Public Opinion* to regularly discover cataclysmic changes in the social fabric. Let it not be said of this journal some years hence that we have proclaimed nine of the last three Seminal Shifts.

Still, what is one to make of poll data displayed on the opposite page, and mentioned in the Kissinger-Moynihan discussion earlier?

The survey, taken by the Opinion Research Corporation earlier this year, says quite simply that substantially more Americans believe that the Soviet Union is stronger than the United States than believe the converse. Moreover, it appears from a search of the data, that this is the first time a national poll reveals that such a view is prevalent in America—although a recent large nine-city poll by the Kettering Foundation confirms the view.

Add to that another datum from our first issue: according to Dr. Gallup, more Americans think that the Soviet Union will increase its power this year than think that America will increase its power this year.

Americans think the Soviet Union is

U.S. is

- ☐ Number one
- ☐ Second to none
- ☐ Second

stronger than America and will continue to get still stronger!

Apparently a third step has been added to an interesting progression of superpower clichés. Until the advent of détente in the early 1970s, standard American political rhetoric proudly proclaimed "America is number one." With the coming of détente a subtle shift ensued: America we were told was "Second to none!" Now the American people have their own description for the situation: "Second."

It behooves us to ask whether Americans *like* this situation. The evidence available is clearly in the negative. A recent Gallup headline reads, "Support for more defense spending reaches highest level in eight years."

These are cosmic facts. Americans think the Soviet Union is stronger, will get still stronger, and they don't like it.

What will happen when the reality sinks in a little further? What will happen when the American public understands the implications—that we are living at a time when our children could grow up in a world where the dominant military force is the Soviet Union—a totalitarian, potentially expansionist, nuclear superpower? What will happen as we look back over history and realize that "most powerful" nations may do this or may do that—but they never do nothing, and what they do is designed to take advantage of their "number one" status?

Perhaps America will be unmoved. Perhaps we are living through one of those seminal shifts in attitude, a discontinuity that allows for a new view of America by Americans. But don't bet on it. We live in a responsive society. If we are second—that can be changed. Accordingly we bet on a seminal shift of *policy*—not attitude—either led by the Carter administration, or wrung out of it, by both Republicans and Democrats. Every shred of sensitivity about the American polity argues against a marching anthem that proclaims "Second" as its reprise. *Ben J. Wattenberg*

A Glimpse at Teenage World

TEENS SEE GRIM FUTURE

Question: Do you think the world will be a better place to live in, in 10 years, or not?



Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Youth Survey), October 17-30, 1977. Respondents were 13-18 years old.

GUIDANCE FOR TEEN-AGE DRINKING

Question asked of parents: Do you have any rules or guidelines regarding the use of alcoholic beverages?


No drinking allowed; no liquor allowed in the house; we don't use it.	43%
We have no rules regarding the use of alcohol	26
Allowed to drink only in the home, in our presence	10
Not allowed to drink until of legal age; when they're "grown-up"	8
Allowed to drink if in moderation	6
No drinking and driving	3
Allowed to drink beer only	2
Other rules	3
Don't know, no answer	3

Note: Total adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. Sample = parents of teenagers.

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), November 4-7, 1977.

ONE OUT OF FIVE SAY PARENTS TOO LAX

Question: Do you think your parents are too strict with you, or not strict enough?



Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Youth Survey), October 17-30, 1977. Respondents were 13-18 years old.

The Nation's "Most Important Problem"

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?¹


One of the unusual strengths of Gallup survey data is the frequent provision of excellent "time series"—information on how the American public views various issues over an extended span. The time series presented here on "What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?" well illustrates this special Gallup contribution.

These data *do not* tell us, it should be noted, what position the populace is taking on the problem or what action it wants. The data *do* testify effectively to the areas where people see the greatest difficulties at any given time, and they point to changes in concern over time.

In the 1950s, foreign affairs were the dominant occupation of Americans, followed by economic problems. For a time in the early 1960s, civil rights and other social issues assumed center stage. But with major U.S. involvement in Vietnam, problems in the foreign policy and defense sectors again were seen as "the most important" by the populace.





Americans today are hardly unconcerned with international affairs, but since the country ended its active military engagement in Vietnam early in 1973, not more than one respondent in ten has described problems of defense and foreign policy as the most demanding. Assorted economic difficulties—notably inflation—have assumed first place in popular attention. The energy problem came from nowhere to acute public awareness shortly after the Arab oil boycott of Fall 1973, as would be expected, and then quickly lost saliency as the long lines at gas stations vanished. In the past year, however, there is indication that energy may have been permanently established as a prime area of active concern.

Everett C. Ladd
Consulting Editor
Opinion Roundup



Important Problem"

Tables and notes on the following page.



OPINION ROUNDUP

	The Economy Foreign Affairs			Social Issues (Graph on previous page shows totals of these two columns)		Govt. Malper- formance	Energy	Other, Don't Know	
	Economic Needs and Problems ²	Foreign Affairs/ National Defense ³	Vietnam ⁴	Race Relations ⁵	Other Social Problems ⁶			All Others ⁹	Don't Know ¹⁰
October- November 1955	10%	49%		2%	%	%	%	28%	17%
September 1956	17	51		18	2			21	10
August- September 1957	24	43		10	6			8	13
September 1958	19	44		9				20	8
September 1959	21	51		5				15	8
February 1960	18	59		6	3	1		19	7
February 1961	37	59		6	1			4	6
April 1962	18	63		6	3			10	9
September 1963	13	25		52				13	5
September 1964	10	46		35		4		17	7
September 1965	8	53	19%	27	10			12	5
May 1966	20	60	45	9	5			11	2
October- November 1967	16	50	50	21				13 ¹¹	
May 1968	12	42	42	25	18			9	3
June-July 1968	12	52	52	13	31			6	1
August 1968	10	51	51	20	21			12	2
January 1969	12	40	40	16	24			16	2
May 1970	10	36	22	13	43			16	2
February 1971	29	40	28	7	21			15	2
June 1971	27	40	33	7	32			14	1
November 1971	41	23	15	6	22			19	4
April 1972	30	41	29	29		2		12	2
June 1972	30	40	32	17	1			13	3
July 1972	28	30	25	28		2		16	2
September 1972	30	37	27	23	3			13	3
February 1973	39	10	3	6	26	3		20	9
May 1973	48	9	3	3	23	14	2	8	3
September 1973	69	7	1	1	15	14	3	11	3
January 1974	30	6		7	22	46		7	3
May-June 1974	48			11	26	6		19	4
October 1974	82			3	11	3		15	2
February- March 1975	80	5			15	7	7	18	3
July 1975	72				10	12	5	20	2
January 1976	70	5			12	4	3	25	3
April 1976	62	5		3	15	17	2	25	3
October 1976	78	6			9	10	1	23	4
July 1977	51	10		2	12	6	15	17	8
October 1977	61	7		2	11	5	18	14	3
February 1978	57	9			9	5	23	11	4

¹ Wording varied slightly over the years.

² Economic Needs and Problems includes: Economic, High Cost of Living, Unemployment, Taxes, Inflation, Prices, Poverty, Welfare, Labor Union Problems.

³ Foreign Affairs/National Defense includes Vietnam and the following: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Keeping the Peace, Relations with Foreign Countries, International Problems and Tensions, Threat of Communism, Lack of Prestige Abroad, Threat of War, Nuclear War, Atom Bomb, Foreign Aid, Defense Preparedness.

In 1974 and 1975 because of the very small and statistically insignificant proportion of respondents identifying some foreign affairs developments as the most important problems, these responses were included in the All Others category.

⁴ Vietnam includes: Vietnam, Indochina and South-east Asia situation. Vietnam percentages are included in Foreign Affairs/National Defense percentages.

⁵ Race Relations includes: Civil Rights, Integration, Segregation, Racial Strife.

⁶ Other Social Problems includes: Crime and Lawlessness, Juvenile Delinquency, General Unrest in the Nation, Riots, College Demonstrations, Drug Abuse and Use, Polarization of Americans, Moral Decline, and Lack of Religion.

⁷ Malperformance by Government includes: Corruption in Government, Watergate, Dissatisfaction with Government, Lack of Trust in Government, Big Government, Excessive Government Spending.

⁸ Energy includes: Energy, Fuel Shortage.

⁹ All Others includes: Pollution, Education, Government Finances, Farm Problems, Others, Miscellaneous, and totals of all others not falling into other categories.

¹⁰ Don't Know includes: Don't Know, No Opinion, Don't Know/No Answer or Can't Say.

¹¹ Includes All Others plus Don't Know.

Note: While respondents were asked the most important problem facing the country, totals add to more than 100 percent because some respondents indicated more than one.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of February 10-13, 1978.

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM TODAY (GALLUP)

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?

High cost of living—inflation	33%
Energy problems	23
Unemployment	17
International problems, foreign policy*	9
Labor unrest, strikes	5
Crime and lawlessness	4
Moral decline/lack of religious commitment	3
Excessive government spending (for social programs)	2
Dissatisfaction with government	3
Drug abuse	2
Poverty	2
All others	11
Can't say	4

*Only 2% of the respondents cited the Panama Canal treaties as the nation's most important problem.

Note: Total adds to more than 100 percent because of multiple responses.

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), February 10-13, 1978.

MOST SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEM (YANKLOVICH)

Question: Here is a list of social problems that people are talking about today. Using the scale at the bottom of this card, please tell me how serious you think each of these problems is to American society today.

	Very Serious/ Serious Problem
Street crimes	88%
Drugs	83
Inflation	79
Unemployment	67
Energy crisis	65
Corruption among government officials	61
Efficiency in the courts	57
Pollution	57
Ability of schools to provide good education	55
Racial problems	46
White collar crimes	45
Threat of war	30

Note: Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-5 whether a problem was very serious (5), serious (4), moderate (3), small (2), or no problem (1).

Source: Survey by Yanklovich, Skelly and White, October-December 1977, sponsored by the National Center for State Courts.

MOST IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (ROPER)


Question: There are a number of problems facing the government today that are either being worked on now, or probably will be in the next year or two. Here is a list of some of them (card shown respondent). Would you read over that list and then tell me which two or three of those problems you personally think are the most important problems for the government to take some action on soon?

Revision of the welfare system	56%
Revision of the income tax system	52
A national energy plan	49
A national health insurance plan for all citizens	46
An arms control agreement with Russia	27
A decision on the proposed new Panama Canal treaties	14
A revision of banking regulations	5
Don't know	3

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, December 1977.

Carter and the Polls

THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL RATINGS



¹ **Gallup question:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Carter is handling his job as President?

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of April 14-17, 1978.

² **Harris question:** How would you rate the job President Carter is doing as President—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

Note: Approve=excellent and pretty good.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April 19-20, 1978.

³ **CBS News/New York Times question:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling his job as President?

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of April 3-7, 1978.

⁴ **NBC News/Associated Press question:** What kind of job do you think Jimmy Carter is doing as President . . . do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?

Note: Approve=excellent and good.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press.

		Approval			
		¹ Gallup	² Harris	³ CBS/ NYT	⁴ NBC/ AP
1977	Feb	(4-7) 66 (18-21) 71	52		60
	Mar	(4-7) 70 (18-21) 75 (25-28) 72	67		63
	Apr	(1-4) 67 (15-18) 63 (29-5/1) 63	69	64	53
	May	(6-9) 66 (20-23) 64	65		61
	Jun	(3-6) 63 (17-20) 63	61		56
	Jul	(8-11) 62 (22-25) 67	59	62	
	Aug	(5-8) 60 (19-20) 66	52		55
	Sep	(9-12) 54	48		
	Oct	(9/30-10/2) 59 (14-17) 55 (21-24) 54	48	55	46
	Nov	(4-7) 55 (18-21) 56	46		43
	Dec	(9-12) 57	50		
1978	Jan	(6-9) 55 (20-23) 52	47	51	41
	Feb	(10-13) 47 (24-27) 51	41		34
	Mar	(3-6) 49 (10-13) 50	36		33
	Apr	(3/31-4/3) 48 (14-17) 39	33	46	29 (Early May)


Note: Exact survey dates shown only for Gallup, because they regularly conduct several surveys per month.

OPINION ROUNDUP

SOLVING THE PROBLEMS: CAN CARTER DO IT? CAN ANYONE ELSE?

Question: Here are some things Jimmy Carter said he would like to do as President. Please tell me whether you think he will or will not be able to (read list). Before, I asked you whether you thought Jimmy Carter would be able to do certain things as President. Now I would like to know if you think these things could be achieved by anybody—some other President, or another branch of government—or whether the problems are beyond government's control. Do you think it is possible or not possible for anyone to (read list).

Carter vs. Anyone Else January 1978



Carter Will

Jan 1978: Possible for Anyone

	Jan 1977	Apr 1977	July 1977	Oct 1977	Jan 1978
Balance the federal budget within the next few years?	34%	26%	23%	22%	18%
Streamline the government and make it more efficient?	58	54	49	42	35
Restore trust in government?	62	67	61	51	51
Reduce unemployment to any real extent?	54	46	37	36	33
Bring peace to the Middle East?	28	28	28	29	34
Make the income tax system more fair?				47	44
Keep prices from going up all the time?	23	18	16	17	13
Handle the energy problem effectively?		48	39	43	38


Possible

33%
59
72
54
72
43
67

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of January 8-12, 1978.

SWINGS IN PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?



Note: Chart shows highest and lowest points in approval ratings during the first 15 months of the President's first term.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of April 14-17, 1978.

THE PRESIDENCY: THE FIRST 15 MONTHS


	Rating at Beginning of Term	Rating After 15 Months
Truman	87%	43%
Eisenhower	68	68
Kennedy	72	77
Johnson	79	71
Nixon	59	56
Ford	71	41
Carter	66	39

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of April 14-17, 1978.


OPINION ROUNDUP

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY RATINGS: ANOTHER VIEW

Harris vs. Gallup



Harris vs. The Post



Amidst the avalanche of polling data which fill our newspapers and air waves daily, none commands more attention than the periodic reports of presidential popularity.

Unfortunately, the two most prominent measures of presidential popularity, the Gallup and Harris ratings, not only frequently diverge—a point long recognized by political scientists—but also yield an incomplete and perhaps even misleading picture of the public's evaluation.

Noting these longstanding dissimilarities, the Washington Post last January asked a national sample of 1,519 adults to rate President Carter's job performance in three different ways—using the Harris question, the Gallup questions, and a new question devised by the Post.

The results of the Post survey indicate two essential problems with the Harris and Gallup questions: they force people to express firm negative or positive views on the President when, in fact, many respondents have neutral, mixed or uncertain feelings, and the ambiguity of their available choices distorts the usual interpretation of the results. Harris, for instance, offers respondents four choices—whether the President's performance is excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor—and then judges all those who say "only fair" or "poor" as "disapprovers." Yet when the Post asked the people who rated Carter as "only fair" (in the Harris poll question) whether they actually "approved" or "disapproved" (in the Gallup question), it found that fully 45 percent actually approved of the President's performance. In other words, a large number of people who are counted in the negative column by Harris are put in the positive column by Gallup.

The Post explored the problem further by asking people to grade the President's job performance as either "A, B, C, D, or F," thus allowing intermediate responses somewhere between outright approval or disapproval. What it found was that a majority (55 percent) of those who gave an "only fair" answer to the Harris question thought Carter deserved a grade of "C"—arguably, neither favorable nor unfavorable. And when responses to the Gallup question are compared to the Post grading scale, the mildly approving or disapproving answers also reveal little conviction.

Among all the respondents surveyed in January by the Post, the Gallup popularity question put Carter's rating at 63-29 positive; the Harris question among those same respondents put his rating at 48-49 negative; while the Post question showed that 41 percent gave him a grade of "A" or "B"; 35 percent

gave him a grade of "C," and 17 percent gave him a grade of "D" or "F." The Post survey suggests, then, that Harris ratings tend to deflate presidential authority, while the Gallup formulation, which compels people to choose between outright approval or disapproval, often inflates it.

The Post question itself surely suffers from certain deficiencies. Respondents are naturally attracted to a middle position like "C." Moreover, without additional evidence one cannot interpret the precise meaning of the "C" grade: to some citizens it represents a mediocre or average rating, to others it is an expression of uncertainty. Still, it is undoubtedly true that many people—though perhaps not all—who gave Carter a "C" do in fact fall into the middle.

A familiar rebuttal to this argument against current popularity ratings is that any single number from Gallup or Harris is not critical—the thing to watch is the trend line, and for that purpose, the present questions are valid. This rebuttal rests on the assumption that imperfect questions introduce a constant random bias, which can safely be ignored in comparisons over time. However, the bias introduced by the poor wording of questions is neither random nor constant. As we have seen, for example, respondents who are ignored by the Harris and Gallup questions—those with neutral views—do not split evenly into approvers and disapprovers. Since the proportion of people holding neutral views changes over time, the amount of distortion also varies.

The impact of presidential popularity ratings is far too great for us simply to conclude with a call for more humility and caution in interpreting poll results. Valid interpretation of public opinion on a single issue requires a variety of questions with different formats and alternative wordings. Economists, for example, have long relied on an assortment of indicators and composite indexes for appraising the performance of the economy.

Yet until now, cost-conscious polling agencies have eschewed such "academic" approaches in measuring something even more elusive, presidential performance. Just as wars are too important to leave to the generals, presidential popularity may be imperiled in the hands of commercial pollsters, unless they amend their ways.

Gary R. Orren

Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University
Public opinion consultant to the Washington Post

The Harris Question:

How would you rate the job Jimmy Carter is doing as President? Would you say he is doing an excellent, pretty good, only fair, or a poor job?

The Gallup Question:

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling his job as President? Is that approve/disapprove strongly, or approve/disapprove somewhat?

The Washington Post Question:

Suppose you were to grade President Carter A, B, C, D or F for the way he is handling his job as President. What grade would you give him?

The Kerner Commission: Ten Years Later

Early in 1968, under the sponsorship of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Kerner Commission"), a national survey was conducted of racial attitudes of blacks and whites residing in the large central cities of the northern U.S. Exactly a decade later, the CBS News/New York Times polling group posed many of the same questions to blacks and whites of big cities in the Northeast and Midwest.

Two especially interesting sets of findings are derived from these parallel surveys, and are published here. First, the 1968 Kerner Commission perception that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white," needs to be reassessed in light of the movement of public opinion over the last decade. The data presented here show, for example, that both whites and blacks are now less inclined to see racial animosity than they were ten years ago. Many more urban white Americans also agree that black Americans have a right to live "wherever they can afford to," and fewer blacks insist that "on the whole . . . most white people . . . want to keep blacks down. . . ." In addition, more urban whites today agree that it is discrimination, rather than failings of blacks themselves, that is responsible for the disadvantaged condition in which the black population finds itself. Such findings surely do not sustain the view that America is pushing further toward two racially distinct societies.

At the same time, as other accompanying data from the 1968 and 1978 surveys attest, the black and the white publics have not been seized by optimism about the future of race relations or the capacity of urban America to respond to its vexing problems.

The position of black Americans, by many objective indicators, has improved since the Kerner Commission wrote its report, and blacks and whites alike now manifest less racial estrangement. But there is growing pessimism about the gap between *the way things are* and *the way one expects they should be*. In the area of race relations as in other sectors of the country's public life, this gap has not narrowed over the past ten years.

The 1968 study was conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, under the direction of Professors Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman. It was funded by the Kerner Commission. The survey included 5,393 black and white respondents from large northern cities. The 1978 survey by CBS News/New York Times included 932 whites, blacks, and other nonwhites from large eastern and midwestern cities. The interviews were conducted February 16-19, 1978.

Commenting upon the two surveys in the New York Times (February 26, 1978) Robert Reinhold added an appropriate caution: "To some extent the responses may be affected by the fact that the survey covered only residents of cities, not suburbs, meaning that many prosperous whites and blacks who have migrated to the suburbs in recent years were excluded."

Everett C. Ladd, Jr.
Consulting Editor, Opinion Roundup

Question: What about other people in your city—white and black. Do you think only a few white people in your city dislike blacks, many dislike blacks, or almost all white people dislike blacks?

	Few	Many	Almost All	No Opinion
1968				
Black	37%	45%	12%	6%
White	23	61	12	4
1978				
Black	51	32	7	10
White	46	38	2	14

Question: How about the reverse? Do you think only a few blacks in your city dislike white people, many dislike white people, or almost all dislike white people?

	Few	Many	Almost All	No Opinion
1968				
Black	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
White	18%	56%	18%	8%
1978				
Black	45	39	5	11
White	31	45	12	12

Note: N.A. = not available for 1968.

Question: Which of these statements would you agree with: first, white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, or second, blacks have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like white people?

	Whites Have Right	Blacks Live Anywhere	Other
White sample only:			
1968	32%	63%	5%
1978	5	93	2

Question: On the whole do you think most white people in your town want to see blacks get a better break, or do they want to keep blacks down, or don't they care one way or the other?

	Better Break	Keep Down	Don't Care	No Opinion
Black sample only:				
1968	29%	28%	33%	10%
1978	25	17	44	14

Question: On the average, blacks have worse jobs, education, and housing than white people. Do you think this is due mainly to blacks having been discriminated against, or mainly due to something about blacks themselves?

	Discrimination	Blacks Themselves	Both	No Opinion
1968				
White sample only	18%	56%	19%	7%
1978				
Black	48	20	16	16
White	28	42	13	17

Question: Some people say that over the last 10 or 15 years there has been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination. Others say that there hasn't been much real change for blacks over that time. Which do you agree with most? Would you say there's been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination, or hasn't there been much real change?

	Lot of Progress	Not Much Change
1968		
Black	65%	35%
White	n/a	n/a
1978		
Black	47	53
White	70	30

Note: n/a = not asked in 1968.

American Professors: How Liberal?

The charts on this page show some of the results of a survey conducted in 1977 among 4,400 faculty members at 161 colleges and universities in the United States. The survey was taken by Professors Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset and was their fifth such sampling of faculty views since 1964.

Among the other findings from the survey were these:

- 81 percent of the faculty members agreed with the statement that "the private business system in the United States, for all its flaws, works better than any other system devised for advanced industrial society";
- 69 percent approved the view that "the growth of government in the U.S. now poses a threat to the freedom and opportunity for individual initiative of the citizenry";
- 54 percent endorsed the proposition that "economic growth,

not redistribution, should be the primary objective of American economic policy";

- 67 percent rated "the private business system" positively, 52 percent rated the "judicial system" positively, and 24 percent gave positive marks to "religious values";
- 46 percent favored reductions in military spending, while 23 percent would maintain or increase current levels;
- 75 percent opposed "swinging" (defined as "the swapping of sexual partners by consenting married couples"), 86 percent rejected "extramarital sexual relations in the absence of spouse's consent," while 62 percent approved of "premarital sex."

Concluded the authors: "American professors are more liberal than professionals in other occupations, but they are far from being radicals or extreme liberals . . ."

The Editors


FACULTY VS. GENERAL POPULATION: DIFFERING POLITICAL "LANDSCAPES"

Questions (NORC): We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?


(Respondent handed card; possible responses=extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate/middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, don't know.)

(Ladd/Lipset): Would you describe your overall political inclinations as: far left, very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, very conservative, far right, none of these?

General population:



Total faculty:




★ Less than 1 percent.

Note: NORC question asked of general population; Ladd/Lipset question asked of faculty.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977; and Everett C. Ladd, Jr. and Seymour M. Lipset, the 1977 Survey of the American Professoriate.

WHICH ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES ARE MOST LIBERAL?



Note: Liberal=far left, very liberal, and somewhat liberal.

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING AMONG PROFESSORS

	1952 Dem.	1956 Dem.	1964 Dem.	1968 Dem.	1972 Dem.	1976 Dem.
All voters	44%	42%	61%	43%	39%	52%
Faculty members	56	62	78	61	57	66
Other professionals	36	32	54	34	31	42
Clerical/sales personnel	40	37	57	41	36	50
Manual workers	55	50	71	50	43	58

Source: Faculty data for 1952 and 1956 are from studies by Lawrence Howard; for 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1976, from surveys by Everett C. Ladd, Jr. and Seymour M. Lipset. Data for "all voters" and other groups are from cumulative Gallup surveys. Percentages for "left" parties are added into the Democratic totals.

TV: Is the Glow Fading?

PEOPLE SAY THEY'RE WATCHING LESS
Daily Average Falls from 3.04 Hours to 2.89 Hours

Question: On the average day, about how many hours do you personally watch television?


1977

Hours spent watching T.V.

	Hours										Daily Average
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9-20	
	Percent										
1975	4	17	27	20	15	8	5	1	2	2	3.04
1977	4	21	25	20	13	6	5	1	2	2	2.89

Note: Nine through 20 hours collapsed due to small percentage of people with those responses.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1975 and 1977.



BUT IS IT STILL TOO MUCH?

Question: Thinking about how you spend your non-working time each day, do you think that you spend too much time or too little time watching television? Reading newspapers? Reading magazines?

Total sample	Watching TV	Reading Newspapers	Reading Magazines
Too much time	32%	5%	6%
Too little time	18	48	52
About right	50	46	41

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), December 9-12, 1977.

HOW DO YOU SPEND YOUR LEISURE TIME?


Question: Which is your favorite way of spending an evening?

	Watching Television	Reading	Staying Home With Family	Movies/Theater	Listening to Radio/Records	Playing Cards/Games	Visiting Friends	Dancing
1938	N/A%	21%	7%	17%	9%	9%	4%	12%
1960	28	10	17	6	*	6	10	3
1966	46	15	5	5	2	5	5	2
1974	46	14	10	9	5	8	8	4
1977	30	15	11	6	4	4	4	*

* = less than 1 percent.

Note: A number of other responses—dining out, resting and relaxing, entertaining friends, participating in sports, sewing, home repair, club and church meetings, crossword puzzles, going to the bar, etc.—are not shown in the table because of the relatively small percentages appearing in each category. In 1977, these responses accounted for 24% of the total.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of December 9-12, 1977.



The Most Admired

THE MOST "MOST ADMIRED": 15 YEARS OF AMERICAN IDOLS

What men and women do Americans most admire? The Gallup organization has been asking that question for many years now, recognizing that the results had far more public appeal than scientific validity. The editors of *Public Opinion* did a quick review of the Gallup data from the last 15 years and came up with a ballpark estimate of the *most* "most admired." The top ten winners in each category:

Men

Dwight Eisenhower
Billy Graham
Lyndon Johnson
Robert F. Kennedy
Richard Nixon
Edward Kennedy
Pope Paul VI
Hubert Humphrey
George Wallace
Harry Truman

Women


Jackie Kennedy
Mamie Eisenhower
Golda Meir
Lady Bird Johnson
Pat Nixon
Rose Kennedy
Indira Gandhi
Queen Elizabeth II
Margaret Chase Smith
Ethel Kennedy

Note: Question wording has varied slightly over the years, but the basic form has been: "what woman (man) that you have heard or read about, living today in any part of the world, do you admire the *most*? Who is your second choice?" (In those years when two choices were sought, the winners were determined by combining first and second choices.) For most years, the question was open-ended; for a few, cards with possible selections were provided. The survey was not conducted for women in 1967 and 1975, nor for men in 1975 and 1976.

Incidentally, the winners for 1977 (in order) were—men: Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Hubert Humphrey, Billy Graham, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Menachem Begin, Ronald Reagan, Pope Paul VI, Richard Nixon (tied with the Pope), Bob Hope. Women: Rosalynn Carter, Golda Meir, Anita Bryant, Betty Ford, Barbara Jordan, Pat Nixon, Barbara Walters, Rose Kennedy, Queen Elizabeth II, and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of December 9-12, 1977.


■ = years when individual was number one among the most admired.



THE FIRST RUMBLINGS: EARLY TRIAL HEATS

AMONG DEMOCRATS, KENNEDY IS CARTER'S CHIEF RIVAL ...


Question: If the Democratic primary for President were being held today and the candidates were Governor Jerry Brown of California and President Jimmy Carter, for whom would you vote? (Asked of Democrats only.)



Note: Respondents saying someone else, 4%; wouldn't vote, 3%; not sure, 12%.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, March 21-22, 1978.


Question: Here is a list of people who have been mentioned as possible presidential candidates for the Democratic party in 1980. (Respondents were handed a card with six names listed.) Which one would you like to see nominated as the Democratic candidate for president in 1980? (Asked of Democrats only.)



Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), March 31-April 3, 1978.

... AND IN GOP, REAGAN AND FORD FIGHT IT OUT ...


Question: If the Republican primary for President were being held today and the candidates were former ambassador George Bush; Kansas Senator Robert Dole; Tennessee Senator Howard Baker; former Governor of California Ronald Reagan; former President Gerald Ford; and former Governor of Texas John Connally, for whom would you vote? (Asked of Republicans only.)



Note: Someone else, 1%; wouldn't vote, 1%; not sure, 4%.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, March 21-22, 1978.

Question: Which ONE would you like to see nominated as the Republican candidate in 1980? (Asked of Republicans only.)



Note: Undecided=7%.

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), March 31-April 3, 1978.

... BUT CARTER IS STILL ULTIMATE CHOICE

Question: If you had to vote all over again for President back in 1976, would you vote for Gerald Ford the Republican or for Jimmy Carter the Democrat?



Note: 8% not sure.

By Region:	Ford	Carter
East	38%	52%
South	38	54
Midwest	47	43
West	45	48

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, March 24-April 3, 1978. Sample=1,005 respondents who voted in the 1976 presidential election.

Question: Let us assume that tomorrow we were going to have a national election for the President of the United States. Of all the names you can think of right now, which one name first comes to your mind that you, yourself, would like to see as our next President?

June 1972	Oct-Nov 1974	April 1978
Nixon 48%	Ford 22%	Carter 21%
McGovern 16	Wallace 13	Reagan 9
Humphrey 13	Reagan 7	Brown 8
Wallace 9	Kennedy 6	Thompson 5
Kennedy 1	Jackson 6	Ford 4
Other 4	Rockefeller 4	Kennedy 4
No choice 8	Bentsen 4	Baker 4
	Muskie 3	Mondale 4
	Humphrey 3	Bush 3
	Other 3	Other 7
	No choice 29	No choice 31

Source: Surveys by Sindlinger Weekly Client Reports, Media, Pennsylvania, latest that of April 12-26, 1978.

Late poll: An April Gallup poll found Ronald Reagan doing slightly better than Ford in trial heats against Carter; the Carter-Reagan results were 50-46%, while the Carter-Ford results were 51-45%. Reagan's strong showing is accounted for by his 52-44% margin over Carter in the South.

TV's Newest Program: The "Presidential Nominations Game"

by Michael J. Robinson

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Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate



A media conference in Berkeley, California, February 1977:

Q. Do you think that Puerto Rico's new primary—coming before New Hampshire—will have any impact on the 1980 election?

A. Yes, both nominees will probably be Puerto Ricans.

Short of assassination, depression or impeachment, Jimmy Carter will almost certainly be the next Democratic nominee for President.

A Gallup poll taken among Democrats in March showed Carter leading Jerry Brown by more than two-to-one. Even in Brown's native California a recent poll by the *Los Angeles Times* puts Carter ahead of Brown by 22 points. The nominations game has changed a lot in the last twenty years, but not that much. Despite Jerry Brown, despite Teddy Kennedy, despite Pat Moynihan, despite anybody, we know who the Democrats will be offering in 1980.

But what about the Republicans: what about the prospects for an out-party in a post-party era? More

generally, what about the path to the presidential nomination in a political environment so dominated by the primaries and the media?

This piece tries to answer those questions: what it takes to win the nomination and who seems most likely to emerge from the Republican pack in 1980—if it isn't Reagan and if my general notions about nominations are valid for specific campaigns.

My approach is guided by a belief, now supported by a growing mountain of evidence, that over the past fifteen years, American politics have been revolutionized. While some of the old politics remains—candidates still need money, good staff, a feel for the electorate and strong organization—the door which now leads to the nomination has a new key, and the key is the media generally, and television specifically. Since 1968, candidates have won the nomination campaign and the nomination with the media and in the media. That should be true in 1980 and well beyond.

Changing Times

To see how much the political terrain has changed, one need look only at some recent history. Until 1968, with


few exceptions, the path toward the nomination was a straight shot for the front-runner. The candidate who started the campaign as front-runner in the first Gallup poll—even if the first poll was conducted as early as three years before the election—became the nominee.

This pattern of front-runner-as-winner has actually been written up as social science “law.” Writing for *Public Opinion Quarterly*, in the spring of 1976, James Beniger concluded that the original front-runner—no matter how many years before the election that status had been achieved—would almost certainly become the nominee.¹ In the old days, and long before he had written his piece, Beniger’s “law” was valid. Between 1936 and 1964, seven of the ten non-incumbents who became nominees actually were the original front-runner, leading in the Gallup poll from the very outset. Only one of these ten nominees came from behind to sweep the polls and, hence, the nomination. That was Wendell Willkie in 1940.²

But more recently, front-runners and the front-runner thesis have come on hard times. Five of the last seven men to win the Democratic nomination, for example, were not the original front-runner. None of the last three Democratic nominees started out as front-runner.

Tracing the Gallup polls for each election since 1936, it becomes perfectly clear that public opinion about potential nominees no longer stands pat during presidential campaigns, as it generally did before 1968. Looking at the last fourteen men who have won the nomination for the party out of power, note how party support has shifted from the time of the first Gallup poll of the election year until the last poll before the nomination:

Figure 1
SHIFT IN PARTY SUPPORT FOR
NONINCUMBENT NOMINEE DURING THE
ELECTION YEAR, 1936–1976



*Only the Gallup “showdown question” is available for Humphrey in 1968.

Note: Early in every election year, the Gallup poll asks members of each party whom they support for the nomination in their party. A similar question is asked just before the party conventions. This chart shows the change in support from the first poll until the last for the man who went on to win the party nomination.

¹ James Beniger, “Winning the Presidential Nomination,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1976, pp. 22–38.

² Willkie’s success at turning the polls around is unique in this pre-television period. Willkie’s case is best attributed to his hard-line stance against the Nazis at a time when the Nazis had successfully invaded Belgium, Holland and France.

Before 1968, as the chart illustrates, the average shift in support for the winners was small—12 percent (or 7 percent without Willkie). Since 1968, the shift has averaged no less than 28 percent. In an era of television and televised primaries, front-runners now lose. Nominees come from nowhere, or at least from far behind. Thus, candidates must actively win nominations; they do not just simply hold on to an early lead.

Media As Kingmaker

Clearly, we need something to explain why front-runners have taken to losing and why the preference polls have taken to shifting so much. We need not look too far. Television and the television news system help explain each of these trends.

Television helps to produce a quickened dissatisfaction with and disinterest in front-runners. Television also makes new faces look good and familiar faces look bad. Television, therefore, produces an environment in which public opinion about potential nominees is much more fluid—much more likely to move toward an unknown challenger who is winning in the early primaries.

So much has television—especially television news—reshaped the political terrain that, as I have argued elsewhere, the key to winning the nomination is merely to be declared the winner by the networks in the New Hampshire primary.³ This “dismal” theory is based on three interrelated “truths.”

The first truth is that the overwhelming majority of delegates attending conventions today are now selected in primaries, a new phenomenon in American politics.

The second truth is that the media—especially the networks—concentrate so heavily on the first primary that the public and the politicians wildly exaggerate its importance.

Third, in a television news system, people who vote in the later primaries, and those who respond in late opinion polls, tend to gravitate slowly but inexorably toward the man declared the “winner” by the media in New Hampshire.

In 1976, with the assistance of Karen A. McPherson, I conducted a study of television and newspaper coverage of the early primaries. The results show that of the network stories devoted to the first eight primaries (New Hampshire through New York), 30 percent were devoted to New Hampshire. (See table 1.) Obviously, the network attention given to New Hampshire was vastly out of proportion to its literal significance.

Compare the coverage of New Hampshire with that given New York. In 1976, New Hampshire cast a total of 82,381 Democratic votes and on the day following the election, received 2,100 seconds of total news time on the three commercial networks. Six weeks

³ Michael J. Robinson, “The TV Primaries,” *The Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 1977, pp. 80–83.

Table 1

PERCENT OF NETWORK NEWS STORIES ABOUT
EACH OF THE FIRST EIGHT PRIMARIES

Total stories—337	
New Hampshire	30%
Massachusetts	15
Vermont	2
Florida	15
Illinois	11
North Carolina	6
New York	9
Wisconsin	12
	<hr/> 100

later, New York cast 3,746,414 Democratic votes and the following day received only 560 seconds on the three shows combined. *In proportionate terms, each Democratic vote in New Hampshire received 170 times as much network news time as each Democratic vote in New York. Media reality—television reality—implied that a victory in New Hampshire totally overwhelmed a victory in New York.*

The predilection for New Hampshire is much more pronounced in television than in print. Because of something that might be called "the hoopla imperative"—the inherent need of television for spectacle—the three networks gave almost 20 percent more of their "newshole" to New Hampshire in 1976 than did three newspapers I studied (the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Columbus Dispatch* in Ohio).

There were arguably two candidates who were victimized by all this in 1976. One was Henry Jackson, the other Ronald Reagan.

Within a few weeks after the 1976 campaign began, Carter was widely perceived as the best bet to win the nomination. It was Carter who was featured on the covers of the newsweeklies and suddenly became America's most widely heralded politician. Yet, after the early primaries, in those six states where Jackson had been a contestant he had actually beaten Carter by over 300,000 votes!

Ronald Reagan also profited very little from network domination of campaign news coverage. In 1968, Eugene McCarthy lost New Hampshire to an incumbent President by 7.7 percent and was declared the "winner" by the networks. In 1972, George McGovern lost to front-runner Edmund Muskie by 9.3 percent and was declared the "winner" by the networks. But in 1976, Reagan lost to an incumbent President by only .8 percent and was declared the "loser." Whatever the reason, there are grounds for thinking that if Reagan had emerged from New Hampshire wearing a winner's crown bestowed by the networks, he might well have captured the nomination, and as he alleges, even the election.

Despite Reagan's claim or Jackson's ill fortune, the lesson here is that a *media victory* in New Hampshire and at least one of the two major communications states shortly thereafter (Massachusetts and Florida) is

tantamount to winning the nomination. Those states separate "winners" from "losers"—and Presidents from also-rans.

The Pre-Primary: From Here to New Hampshire

How, then, should a candidate prepare to win New Hampshire and one of the other big media states? What should the dozen or so Republicans now in the field be doing over the next two years?

In his 1976 book, *The Invisible Primary*, Arthur Hadley argued that the nomination is actually won in the three years *before* New Hampshire—in what I have called the pre-primary campaign.⁴ In order to win the pre-primary—according to Hadley—a candidate must establish psychological momentum; put together a good staff; select a good strategy; raise lots of money; impress the media, and build a loyal constituency—and in that order of priority.

The last two campaigns, especially Carter's, convince me that Hadley was right in stressing the pre-primary but wrong in his choice of what counts. Looking ahead to the next two years, it may well be the media that are crucial.

Who's Credible?

For starters, consider the matter of legitimacy. In order to win in the early primaries, a candidate no longer need be ahead in the national polls, but he must be regarded as credible. There are three paths to credibility. The first is to have been there before, as Ford, Reagan, and Jerry Brown have been. The second is to have been a former vice presidential nominee. Hence Bob Dole. The third path is to have held an elective office—House of Representatives or higher—and to have received the "Great Mention."

Ah, the "Great Mention"—the *sine qua non* of successful starlets, politicians and political scientists alike. In a post-party age, Great Mentioners are the media—not the media defined broadly but defined narrowly. Specifically, print provides the Great Mention.

Thirty years ago, a group of sociologists at Columbia said that public opinion shifts when the press provides news, especially campaign news, to "opinion leaders." Opinion leaders digest the news and then pass it along to the voting public. This was the famous two-step flow hypothesis, and for decades it was *de rigueur* among social scientists. If nothing else, the two-step flow explained how mass opinion changes—something few communications theories have ever done. But even if this two-step theory were once correct (and I doubt it), it is surely obsolete today. There is no two-step flow of public opinion. But, there is a two-step flow of media opinion. The flow moves first from print and then to television—and finally to the public.

The Great Mention follows this same two-step flow in presidential politics. Early "opinions" about presidential contenders originate with the New York

⁴ Arthur T. Hadley, *The Invisible Primary* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

Times, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the three major newsweeklies. The *Times* remains pre-eminent because the networks still work mostly out of New York.

Strategist Hamilton Jordan grasped this point early on, and apparently taking the hint, Carter quickly reached out for the print media. After learning their names and backgrounds (it is reported that he read *The Boys on the Bus* by Timothy Crouse at least twice), he cultivated the print journalists with invitations to Georgia and exclusive interviews.

It worked. Between November of 1975 and February of 1976, by my count, Carter got more "ink" from

Table 2

TV AND PRINT STORIES FOR THE
SEVEN MOST-COVERED DEMOCRATS,
NOVEMBER 1975-FEBRUARY 1976

Candidate	TV Stories (41)	Print Stories (114)
Carter	15%	30%
Wallace	22	21
Jackson	12	18
Harris	15	10
Bayh	12	8
Humphrey	10	7
Udall	15	6
	101%	100%

Note: The TV stories were those on the evening news of the three commercial networks. The newspaper stories were counted in the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch*. Only stories focusing on a single candidate were counted. Numbers do not add to 100% because of rounding.

the printed press than any other Democrat, an astounding accomplishment given his standing in the polls and among party leaders at the time. (Table 2.)

Equally interesting was Carter's inability to capture a disproportionate share of the early network coverage. In TV coverage my data show that Carter tied only for second place with two other candidates. Whether he intended it or not, Carter worked through print to get to television. Print was thus his Great Mentioner.

One might ask why the network people defer to print during the pre-primary. The answer is that the networks still believe that print people know more, an idea drummed into their heads as far back as journalism school. Network people all read the newspapers religiously; print people watch the networks only occasionally. Network people also worry more about making a candidate credible in the public eye because they know how much more "powerful" they can be than print as the campaign moves along. So, they defer to the print media in the early stages, allowing them to establish the original field. Later on, the networks shed their deference and become the medium of record. In 1980, we can expect television to establish its pre-eminence just after the Iowa caucus and at the time of the New Hampshire primary.

How Many? How Open?

The proliferation of presidential candidates is another byproduct of the television age. Typically, a politician in earlier days would work for years before he could establish a national reputation. But with the advent of television, that reputation can be etched onto the public mind almost overnight. The volatility of public attitudes and the adoption of the primary system by over half the states—two other phenomena associated with television's hoopla imperative—mean that almost every candidate has a relatively good chance to pull a media coup. And not surprisingly, more and more are willing to try.

Ironically, the media have benefited the most from all this. In so open a field, with so many candidates and so few votes to go around, audiences need more interpretation as to what the vote means. Obviously, media then become the interpreters. And the process feeds on itself.

How Meaningful?

The modern pre-primary is longer and more crowded, and predictably, it is also less "substantial." Without a war or one central polarizing issue, the pre-primary may become the last place where a politician may want to try out a new idea in public policy.

In January 1972, speaking in Iowa, George McGovern first proposed his famous plan for awarding a thousand dollar "demogrant" to every American. In September 1975, Ronald Reagan, speaking in Chicago, first suggested his formula for federalism—a \$90 billion cut in federal spending. Within six months, each of these proposals had come back through the media to haunt the candidate who had offered them.

One may say that both proposals backfired because they were lousy. But I would argue that the television news system also played a major role. Unlike new faces, which television seems to like, *new ideas—whether from left or right—tend to produce negative coverage*. This is especially true for television because the "fairness doctrine" virtually compels journalists to cover the other side of the issue by interviewing experts who discredit the whole proposal as absurd. Fresh ideas come out sounding less like new and more like dumb.

The Media Terrain: How to Master It

A typical presidential candidate for 1980, then, looks out upon a political landscape that has been transformed by the media. How should he be advised to cross it?

There are four major types of media terrain that every candidate must confront—local print, local television, national print and national television. Each has different demands and must fit differently into a campaign strategy.

The national media, print and television, are tougher than the local to manipulate or accommodate. Politicians recognize that, often accusing the national media of being cynical and more "cannibalistic." What

many candidates fail to appreciate, however, is the particularly vast chasm between local and national television. Local newscasts are so tied to budget, film, good looks and to the community power structure in which they operate from day to day that their broadcasts represent the "smoothest" terrain any candidate can possibly expect.

Another thing candidates must consider is that national networks track them for months; local stations have them for only a few days. Through familiarity, networks eventually wind up "doing a job" on candidates; through appreciation, local TV stations usually present pap. The lesson is that of all four types of media, national television is probably the most likely to give candidates "bad press," while local television is the most likely to give them a good ride.

The strategic message in this analysis for many Republicans—a Howard Baker, for instance, a George Bush, or a Bob Dole, and so on—boils down to this: *as a matter of campaign priorities between here and New Hampshire, each candidate should (1) work hard to establish himself early with most of the elite reporters and columnists of the national newspapers and magazines; (2) do as much as possible to appear on local television in those states that hold early caucuses and primaries; (3) work with local print, but after working with local television; and (4) contrary to instinct, keep the network news folks in reserve until the later stages of the campaign.*

The notions that national television should be used last and that the networks should be cultivated primarily through national print are heresy to most candidates.

Yet experience has shown time and again that those whom the networks create, they also destroy. Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar argue that the media inexorably move through three *phases* with incumbent Presidents—first the media support them, then they are neutral, and finally they treat them with a detachment that borders on outright hostility.⁵ That same theory, I believe, applies to presidential candidates. And it applies especially in the realm of television, which moves through its "phases" much more rapidly than any other medium.

After Iowa, Carter distinctly moved through each of these three phases, more so with television than in print. But because—consciously or unconsciously—he had held back so long from over-exposure to television, the networks did not enter "phase three" until April, after his nomination was already rather secure. Ed Muskie, by contrast, entered "phase three" with the networks in February of his crucial try for the presidency, a bit of history that should be instructive.

Putting Things Together: The Thompson Case

One problem with building any theory is that it should

predict. Does my emphasis on pre-primary and media predict what will happen between now and 1980 among the Republicans?

I understand that if I choose anyone but Ronald Reagan, I'm looking for trouble. On almost every traditional dimension—except his age—Reagan looks good. He even looks good in terms of media, *if* we define media as one's style and experience with television campaigning. We sometimes forget that Reagan is a former movie star.

But Reagan as the "shoo-in" Republican nominee violates three major principles espoused here—that, since 1968, there are few shoo-ins, few old faces that sell, and few acknowledged front-runners who can cope with a media that hates shoo-ins. And, admittedly, a Reagan prediction would also violate one other principle: never end a piece with an unexciting forecast, a principle which certainly helps explain the other three.

So, if one assumes first that Reagan doesn't win for whatever reason, and one assumes no massive "rules" changes—like national primaries—which candidate would a media-based theory predict as pre-primary or primary campaign winner? Some like Gerald Ford or Robert Dole. Others see Howard Baker or John Connally as a good media-based prediction. But I go with Governor Jim Thompson of Illinois.

On the "old" criteria, Thompson has considerable strength. He's a governor, which seems advantageous once again. By the end of this year, he will have demonstrated for a second time an unusual capacity to appeal to independent voters in a large, industrial state. He leads a state that sends the third largest number of Republicans to the Congress. And he hasn't had time to alienate many rank-and-file Republicans, though some say he has been trying.

But these are the old criteria. How does he look as a candidate of the media age? He looks good—both for the pre-primary and the primary campaigns.

First, Thompson has already received the Great Mention—indeed, over a period of two weeks early this year, he received four "Great Mentions" in the national press. Print is talking about Thompson, as am I.

Second, Thompson has had the advantage of having learned how to deal with the networks without having become too close to them. Before he moved on to Springfield, Thompson's work as a crime-buster had made him a media-darling in Chicago, and Chicago is one of the few cities in the country that has three "owned and operated" network stations—stations which are not simply affiliated with, but actually belong to, the networks. The networks also have major bureaus there.

At the risk of overlearning from the immediate past, there is a comparison to be drawn between Carter in the early seventies and Thompson today. It was to some degree Carter's exposure to the networks in Atlanta, where bureaus are also maintained, that taught Carter about national television. And the Atlanta bu-

⁵Michael Grossman and Martha Kumar, "White House Operations and the News Media: The Phases of a Continuing Relationship," unpublished manuscript, Towson State University, 1977.

reus in turn gave the networks a chance to learn more about Carter after he had received the Great Mention. Thompson can easily play the same strategy.

Third, there is the "Iowa Connection." Thompson has a chance to clean up in Iowa, that early caucus state which leads directly to New Hampshire—so long as Iowa Governor Bob Ray chooses not to run. (Ray right now lacks the Great Mention.) Thompson not only sits next to Iowa geographically, but he can also "work" Iowa through local TV news—the world's softest political medium. Through cable out of Chicago and through normal broadcast signals from Rock Island and Moline, Thompson can "connect" with at least a fifth of the Iowa population through local news.

I would feel much more strongly about Thompson were we not talking about Republicans. In studying the past two campaigns, I have naturally focused more on the out-party Democrats. But if professional polling has shown anything, it has shown that Democrats and Republicans are different. And, because Republicans are essentially more ideological and more policy-oriented than Democrats, *media theories work less well for Republicans than for Democrats.*

Besides that, insiders claim that Thompson will not run. He thinks that finishing his next term as gov-

ernor in Illinois would not only give him more experience, it would also put him in the market for a new job in January 1983—with two full years of pre-primary left before the 1984 election—and without any Ronald Reagan to worry about. Thompson may also be too "moderate" for a party which is so small and so pure that it feels less obliged to accommodate itself to moderates, especially in 1980.

Finally, although Thompson does well on the *givens* in our media theory, we simply cannot predict how he will do on the *unknowns*—how he will do in his actual television "screen tests." No media-based theory can ever be used to predict or to produce a real winner out of a real loser. Thompson looks quite interesting in theory, but not yet in practice.

Despite all that, I think that his media advantages—his Great Mention, newness, network contacts, and the "Iowa Connection"—make Jim Thompson an outsider to watch, if not to bet on.

Thompson also has a unique advantage in media-based name recognition. Through television, the public has gotten terribly used to asking the political question "Jimmy Who?" In 1980, the Republican answer could conceivably be "Jimmy" Thompson of Illinois.

☐

Four GOP Strategists Look at Their Party's Hopes

From Here to New Hampshire

Public Opinion recently asked four of the leading strategists in the Republican party to assess their party's presidential prospects for 1980—the kind of GOP candidates who could win and what it would take to put him into the White House. Excerpts from their responses are printed here.

At first blush, the four might appear to be sharply divided: two were key operatives in the Ford campaign in 1976, while the other two held top posts in the Reagan organization. Yet, they have a striking number of similarities—all are relatively young, highly regarded, likely to influence Republican fortunes for some time to come, and, as illustrated here, share a surprising number of views.

John Deardourff

Can a candidate from the "moderate" wing of the Republican party be nominated for President in 1980? It does not seem likely.

As the Carter administration stumbles through its second year, bereft of either direction or accomplishment, the opportunity for a Republican with broad-based voter appeal becomes obvious. But the President's vulnerability serves only to heighten the frustration of most Republican moderates, who are painfully aware that there is no way to be elected unless you are first



John D. Deardourff



John M. Sears



David A. Keene



Robert M. Teeter

nominated.

The moderate problem is simple: there is a surfeit of electable moderate Republicans, in and out of public office, but there is a severe shortage of moderate Republican voters.

The number of voters calling themselves Republicans and willing to participate in the nominating process has dropped dramatically in recent years. Essentially middle-of-the-road voters are the ones who have drifted away, leaving behind a Republican party that is more

conservative, more white, more Protestant, more Northern and much older than the electorate to which it must appeal to win national office. And, incredibly, as the GOP has shrunk, the doctrinaire conservatives who remain are spending increasing amounts of time and money waging war on the moderates in their own party—driven, apparently, by the ludicrous notion that the party can revive itself only by becoming even more doggedly conservative.

The irony of the conservative Republican predilection for purging the moderate wing is, of course, that the moderates are the *only* Republicans who consistently win statewide elections in the large, diverse states of the Northeast, the Middle West and the West—the states that under any but the most bizarre electoral strategy must be captured to win the presidency.

Despite the long list of moderate GOP officeholders—a number of whom would be attractive national candidates—the fact remains that *so much of the internal machinery of the Republican party is in hardcore conservative hands that the possibility of nominating a moderate Republican for President in 1980 seems remote—so remote, in fact, that it is not now clear that there will even be a major moderate candidate in the field* (unless former President Ford, now viewed as an apostate by the leadership of the Republican right, decides to make the race. His would be a special, and very interesting, campaign situation). The battle for the Republican nomination may, in fact, be waged entirely by various men of the New Right, the Old Right, the Reagan Right, and so on, trying to woo voters on the basis of who is the most rigid, uncompromising conservative of them all.

Given this situation in the Republican party, any hope of nominating a moderate for President would seem to depend on four factors:

1. A substantial strengthening of moderate “clout” within the party by the election this fall of new Republican governors in states like New York, Pennsylvania, Oregon and Tennessee (in each of which the situation looks promising); the reelection of current GOP governors in other major states like Michigan, Ohio, Illinois and Iowa; and the willingness of all these governors, as well as others, to take a more aggressive part in the presidential candidate selection process than they have previously.
2. A very early decision by a single, strong moderate

candidate to make the race for the nomination and a willingness by most of the others to support that candidacy. A single moderate, running against a string of conservative opponents, *might* have a chance to gain early momentum and run a strong race. That candidate would have to enter the race early in 1979 and plan to run in virtually all the early primaries. Any chance for success would depend on limiting the number of moderates in the race; in the past the moderate wing of the GOP has shown no capacity for such a disciplined approach.

3. Adoption of a bold, unorthodox tactic that would give high visibility to the campaign and might at the same time quickly capture the imagination of voters—a tactic such as the immediate announcement of one’s vice presidential choice and a decision to campaign *as a team* for the nomination. The novelty of this approach would be further enhanced if one of the pair were a woman, such as Anne Armstrong, Carla Hills, Jill Ruckleshaus or Millicent Fenwick.
4. Concentration on a set of issues on which it may be possible to develop a Republican consensus and which could also serve as the basis for an affirmative appeal to the much larger and more diverse general electorate. It seems likely that the Republican right will continue to emphasize the divisive “anti” issue of the hour—anti-Panama Canal treaties, anti-gun control, anti-ERA and anti-abortion. In contrast, a moderate Republican presidential ticket could, within the framework of a centrist philosophy, present itself to the American people as a caring, intelligent, responsive vehicle for change.

Will any of it happen? Perhaps. Significant electoral gains by moderate Republican candidates in 1978 are a distinct possibility. Beyond that, however, the picture is *very* murky. Moderate Republican leaders have traditionally shown little propensity for sustained cooperation among themselves, little commitment to careful long-range planning, little stomach for the tough battles which will have to be fought with the conservatives, and very little inclination toward the bold tactical strokes that would seem essential to victory. Maybe 1980 will be different; but it is more likely that the moderate wing of the Republican party will continue its long march to what British journalist Henry Fairlie, in his biting little book, *The Parties*, calls “the elephant graveyard.”

David Keene

None of the men now being discussed as Republican contenders can win by simply trying to refight the 1976 campaign or riding the same themes that worked for Mr. Carter. Instead, they are going to have to run in an atmosphere that has largely been created by the incumbent President since he took office.

Mr. Carter won in 1976 because he gave the people what they thought they wanted: a fresh face, free from

the entanglements of the past. Unfortunately for him, his party, and the country, however, he has managed since then to give outsiders a bad name and make it virtually impossible for a candidate using his themes to win in 1980. In fact, familiarity with government and with Washington could even turn out to be an asset next time.

People are also beginning to conclude not just that

Mr. Carter is doing things wrong, but that he doesn't really know what he is doing; that he is out of his depth. If this impression sinks in during the next few months, Carter will enter 1980 in serious trouble.

Competence, then, could be *the* issue next time around. The American people aren't going to send Jimmy Carter back to Plains for purely ideological reasons, but they will if he convinces enough of them that he isn't up to the job.

It follows that the strongest GOP nominee will have to be seen as competent and be prepared to take advantage of Mr. Carter's weaknesses. The question, of course, is which of the many potential candidates is best positioned to take advantage of all this and how should he go about doing so?

Republican Should Not Run as an Ideologue

The Republican nominee can be either a conservative or a moderate conservative, but he shouldn't plan to run as an ideologue. The American people are marginally more conservative than they were a few years ago, and the GOP isn't likely to nominate anyone more liberal than Howard Baker anyway.

But Mr. Carter's problems among those voters who might conceivably support the GOP nominee are decidedly non-ideological. They are going to want a candidate who agrees with them on the issues, but they will also be looking hard for a person who has the ability and experience to actually run the government. Their concern with Mr. Carter's competence could easily scare them enough to drive them to a GOP challenger who doesn't frighten them off for other reasons.

Mr. Ford has problems in this area, though even next to Mr. Carter, he could look competent by 1980. Mr. Reagan's appeal in 1976 went beyond ideology because people saw him as competent and were impressed by what they perceived as his success in California. Mr. Baker has managed to unite a diverse lot of GOP senators and certainly isn't seen as incompetent, but his image as a strong, competent figure is still largely unformed. No one knows much about the long shots. Jim Thompson, Phil Crane and Lowell Weicker are mostly unknown quantities at this time. The only other potential candidates on the periphery who might make competence an issue because of their current reputations are John Anderson of Illinois, George Bush and former Treasury Secretary Bill Simon.

If it is assumed that the eventual Republican nominee can hold most of what his party's 1976 nominee carried in the West and Southwest, voters are going to have to be picked up in the South, the Midwest and the Northeast in order to win. Most of the South can be expected to stay with Carter, although a Ronald Reagan or Howard Baker might pick off a couple of states. The real battleground areas, however, will be found in the Midwest and the Northeast where Carter is in trouble but where Republicans ordinarily don't do very well.

These key battlegrounds will not be carried by a Republican simply because he's more conservative or liberal than Carter, but they might well be taken by a candidate who convinces people that if elected, he'll be able to handle the job. Whether any of them can do that is a question to which everyone—including Jimmy Carter—would like to have the answer. ☐

John Sears

Jimmy Carter is perhaps the most politically vulnerable elected incumbent we have seen in this country in the twentieth century. Even though the Great Depression made Herbert Hoover severely unpopular by the 1932 election and Theodore Roosevelt's presence on the Bull Moose party ticket rendered William Howard Taft politically impotent in 1912, neither suffered from the unique characteristics which make Mr. Carter so weak. Some of the things which must worry today's White House include the following:

Carter's Party Position—Ordinarily an incumbent President has a strong base of support in his own party. The extenuated process by which we nominate Presidents gives most party members an almost personal investment in the fate of an elected President and to a degree, "right or wrong," he is that party's President. Mr. Carter's campaign for the presidency, however, singled out not only the Republicans as the "enemy" but also a large segment of the congressional wing of his own party and some unnamed and ill-defined special interests. His attempts to achieve a reasonable middle position have isolated him from both the left wing of his own party as well as the more traditional party fac-

tions such as organized labor. The only truly enthusiastic support he received in 1976 was from black voters whose enthusiasm has since waned. To put it mildly, leaders in the Democratic party power structure, both to the left and right of him, do not trust Mr. Carter and seem to laugh all too loudly at his embarrassment.

His Standing with the People—The well-conceived and executed campaign strategy which Mr. Carter pursued in 1976 leaned heavily on the electorate's distrust of establishment politics after ten years of Vietnam and Watergate. The Carter theme was a sophisticated combination of "throw the rascals out" and "send 'em a message." Masterfully, he managed to raise hopes against the grain of the prevailing cynicism in the electorate.

However, the fact that he has been unable to fulfill the hope he engendered has given him more than the normal exposure among the loose and disparate coalition of voters who voted for him in 1976. In other words, Mr. Carter's personal constituency, having been built on the basis that he could succeed where others had failed and *not* having been built on a strong party or philosophical basis, is severely threatened as his per-

formance in office comes under criticism. As a result, he is not only down in the polls, but down among every segment of the population. Lyndon Johnson and George Romney could speak volumes on what can happen to a politician once his competency is called into question; for Mr. Carter, that issue could become devastating.

His Personal Political Problems—Jimmy Carter won narrowly against a weak incumbent. He also lost badly in the Far West, and there is little reason to think he has improved his popularity in that part of the country since 1976. Any combination of strategies which could either chip away at his Southern strength or take advantage of his obvious weakness with ethnic Catholics and Jews in the Northeast would spell his doom.

So far, Mr. Carter has chosen to maintain his centrist position but to continue to do so makes it predictable that he will further weaken himself in the Northeast and probably weaken himself in the South since both areas have a more pronounced (although differing) political coloration than he does. Obviously, he will have to move sometime either to rejuvenate his identity with the South or strengthen himself in the Northeast. When he does, he will make it possible for the Republicans to establish a foothold in the neglected territory, since it is politically impossible for a President to spend the money necessary to appease the political interests of the Northeast and, at the same time, accommodate the fiscal conservatives of the South.

Who Can Win the GOP Nomination?

With regard to the potential Republican candidates for 1980, the prize will go to a man who can best impress the electorate with his competence to handle the office of President, who already has a strong base in the party and who can demonstrate a strong personal popularity in a specific area of the country. In my opinion, there will be no Jimmy Carter-style victories in the Republican nomination process in 1980.

Applying these criteria, I see six truly potential candidates: Ronald Reagan, Gerald Ford, Robert Dole, Howard Baker, John Connally and Governor Jim Thompson of Illinois. If they were all to run, Reagan would win with ease since he is the only one who still possesses a solid personal constituency and a proven ability to raise money. However, politics is never that simple and the history of recent years certainly establishes that early front-runners have seldom been able to fulfill their promise. The experiences of Edmund Muskie in 1972 and a raft of Democrats in 1976 seem to assure that the process will be lively and unpredictable in 1980.

I must confess, however, that I did make a wager with a Democratic friend of mine the other day, and the last time I felt sure enough of something in politics to bet on it was when I bet someone that Richard Nixon would win in 1972. My bet is that in 1980, the Republican nominee will be known before the Democratic nominee and whoever that person is will become the next President of the United States. ☑

Robert Teeter

Assuming that the Republicans can recapture the White House from Jimmy Carter—and that possibility looms larger now than ever before—there are two general areas of concern that every serious GOP candidate must address between now and 1980.

The first is the traditional one of organization, an element that most Republican candidates and campaigns have tackled reasonably well in the past. The most important step in this process is to develop a "state strategy," identifying the states that can logically form part of a winning coalition and recruiting a cadre of people within each state who can help the candidate win the state's primary or convention. A candidate who begins with only a handful of states as his base is at a distinct disadvantage to one who begins with a third to half of the votes already needed to win. President Ford's campaign certainly experienced this problem in 1976 when it opened with a base of only 90-100 electoral votes compared to 190-200 then considered fairly safe for Carter.

In recent years it has also become increasingly important for a campaign organization to attract the best possible people, not only because of their abilities but because the question of "who signs up with whom" is now a key public relations signal to political reporters, party officials, and other pundits and observers. Public

financing has made the money people less important than in the past, but they are still crucial, especially in the early stages of the campaign. Several potential Republican candidates have already established political action committees, and the more money they can attract now, the more staff they can support, the more mail they can send, the more mailing lists they can buy, the more trips they can take, and so on. Finally, in every organization, a candidate must pay close attention to the great dance of political reporters, columnists and the candidates—who gets mentioned in the media, the early public polls, who is spotted as the front-runner, and on and on and on. This phase of the campaign will become critically important as soon as the 1978 elections are held.

The Need for a Grand Design . . .

The second crucial area of activity that must concern a candidate may require less exertion but it is one that Republican candidates, especially moderates, have not handled well in the past—and that is to develop a basic theme, vision, or grand design for the country and to communicate it to the voters.

The 1976 election was a watershed: voters were looking for a breather from the turmoil and cynicism that had gripped the nation for more than a decade. People then and since have been looking for a more

orderly, calm rational way of solving national problems. There are already signs, however, that in 1980 or 1984 the country will once again be looking for someone with a vision of the future—and the personal capability to achieve it. It seems clear that President Carter does not fit that prescription. Thus, I believe that in 1980, 1984 or possibly even the 1988 election, we will see a strong new leader emerge, one who could potentially mold his party into a majority coalition for several generations to come.

... And What It Should Be

In developing such a vision for the 1980s, a Republican must avoid the old bi-polar liberal/conservative fight: it is simply not relevant to a majority of voters anymore and just as importantly, in my view, it would be suicidal for any Republican candidate in the 1980 national election to be labeled either *the* liberal or conservative candidate. Candidates who can be successfully portrayed as extremists do not win national elections.

This is not to say that traditional Republican principles must be jettisoned. To the contrary, recent elections have shown that those principles are not doing

badly; the problem is that more Democratic candidates are winning on them than Republicans. A minority party simply cannot afford the luxury of ideological bickering that has afflicted Republicans in the past decade or two. One of my greatest concerns as a Republican is that the party is becoming more introspective, more defensive, and more rigid—characteristics of a group doomed to minority status.

The way that Republicans can win in the 1980s—and this is entirely consistent with traditional principles—is to find better ways for Americans to work and live as individuals in a society that is increasingly complex and overwhelming. Further, within that context of renewed individualism, Republicans must also address ways to improve the quality of life—which for many people means being able to buy your own home, hold a job, raise your kids to an educational level above your own, afford adequate health care, and enjoy decent recreational opportunities. To most Americans, these are problems that the Carter administration is not solving—but even more importantly for Republicans, they are also viewed as problems that cannot be solved by the old liberal/conservative fight. ☒

From Here to New Hampshire

The White House or Plains in 1980?

by Burns W. Roper

Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg put forth two theses in the premiere issue of *Public Opinion*. They attribute Jimmy Carter's election in 1976 to a change on the part of Southern whites from their normal pattern of voting "conservative" (i.e., for Ford) to voting "Southern" (i.e., for Carter). They further speculate that the white South, having proven the electability of a Southerner as President, will revert to voting "conservative" in 1980. In short, the same white Southern voters who put Carter in the White House in 1976 may return him to Plains in 1980.

While their analysis is perceptive and certainly provocative, there is abundant evidence, I believe, which suggests quite the opposite result in 1980.

It may be true, for example, that Southerners believed in 1976 that Ford was more conservative than Carter, but they hardly viewed Carter as a liberal. A Roper poll taken as Carter took office showed that 33 percent of Southerners viewed him as "very" or "moderately" conservative, while a smaller 28 percent thought he was "very" or "moderately" liberal (18 percent viewed him as "middle of the road," and the balance undecided). Not awfully liberal then, and as the authors concede, public opinion polls show that fewer Americans today regard Carter as a "liberal" than when he was elected.

Moreover, the test of a "conservative" needs a bit

of defining, or refining. A good deal of the conservatism that exists in the South is conservatism of a God-Church-family-temperance nature, as opposed to conservatism on day-to-day political issues. Certainly, President Carter cannot be perceived as "liberal" in these dimensions.

Looking beyond Carter's Southern appeal, there are many other important factors that bear on Carter's electability or non-electability come 1980—and they also suggest a quite different outcome. In particular, there is the advantage of incumbency, a subject wholly ignored in the Scammon-Wattenberg analysis. Over the

Table 1
INCUMBENTS IN LAST FIFTY YEARS WHO RAN
AGAIN—AND HOW THEY FARED

Year	Incumbent	Outcome
1932	Hoover	Lost
1936	FDR	Won
1940	FDR	Won
1944	FDR	Won
1948	Truman	Won
1956	Ike	Won
1964	LBJ	Won
1972	Nixon	Won
1976	Ford	Lost

last fifty years, incumbents have run for reelection in nine presidential races. In seven of these nine races, the incumbents have won.

Evidence frequently cited in support of the contention that Carter may be a one-term President is his decline in the polls. While public approval ratings were not cited by Scammon and Wattenberg in support of their contention, a look at presidential approval ratings and how they subsequently translated into second-term election results is instructive with respect to Carter's future electability.

Table 2

GALLUP APPROVAL RATINGS OF LAST SEVEN PRESIDENTS AFTER TWELVE MONTHS IN OFFICE—AND HOW THEY FARED IN NEXT ELECTION

President	Twelve Months Approval	Next Election
Kennedy	77%	Did not run
Johnson	69	Won by 23 pt. margin
Eisenhower	68	Won by 15 pt. margin
Nixon	61	Won by 23 pt. margin
Carter	52*	???
Truman	50	Won by 4 pt. margin
Ford	46	Lost by 3 pt. margin

* While regional results lack the accuracy of national results, it is interesting that Carter's deep South rating (among whites and blacks combined) was the highest of any region—59 percent.

As can be seen, Carter's rating at the end of a year in office was slightly higher than Truman's at a comparable time, and Truman went on to win in 1948 by a margin somewhat larger than Carter's initial election victory. Moreover, Truman won despite the fact that he dropped into the low thirties in approval ratings prior to the 1948 election. Carter's rating is also just nine points below Nixon's rating at a comparable time, and Nixon went on to win reelection by over 23 points—the largest victory margin of any election in recent years. Ford is the only one of these men who did not win as an incumbent, but he still came within three points of victory even though he was six points behind Carter's twelve-month rating.

Still more evidence suggesting the opposite of Scammon and Wattenberg's contention are the results from a Roper poll this past December asking people whether, if the election were held again the following week, they would vote for Carter or Ford. The answers indicated that (a) Carter is stronger now in the nation

Table 3

ROPER "HORSE RACE" RESULTS—DECEMBER 1977 *

	U.S. Totals (Whites & Blacks)	Whites Who Live:	
		In the South	Outside the South
Would now vote for:			
Carter	50%	47%	46%
Ford	36	39	39
Undecided, wouldn't vote, and so on	14	14	15

* Answers of respondents who claim to have voted in 1976.

Question: "Suppose that next week there were a new national election for President of the United States, and the candidates were President Jimmy Carter on the Democratic ticket, and former President Gerald Ford on the Republican ticket. Do you think you'd vote for Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford?"

as a whole (a 14 point lead) than he was when he was elected in 1976 (a 3 point lead); (b) Carter would carry the white South now (an 8 point lead) whereas he failed to carry it in 1976 (a 2 point loss); and (c) he would do at least as well among whites in the South as he would with whites in the rest of the country. If Carter fares as well among whites in the South as in the rest of the country, that suggests one of two things: either regional bias/preference is continuing to offset white Southern conservatism or the conservatism of white Southerners is no greater than that of other whites. Both propositions cast doubt on the Scammon-Wattenberg theory.

The external "evidence" I have cited seems to me at least as compelling on the side of the thesis that Carter is likely to be reelected as is the Scammon-Wattenberg evidence that he is likely not to be reelected.

My purpose, however, is not to establish that Carter *will* be reelected, for I do not find that either their evidence or mine really proves anything definite. My point is that based upon historical experience as well as recent polls, there is simply no way of knowing two and one-half years ahead of a presidential election—and before the opposing candidate is known—whether an incumbent will win or lose, or by how much. After a year in office, for instance, Johnson and Nixon had rather different approval ratings, but they were the two incumbents who won by the widest margins in their second-term races. Eisenhower, on the other hand, with a better rating than Nixon's and nearly the same approval level as Johnson's, did noticeably less well in his second-term bid than either Johnson or Nixon. Johnson and Nixon, I would argue, chalked up large victories the second time around because they ran against candidates who were widely perceived to be extremists (one of the right, one of the left). By contrast, Eisenhower ran against a moderate—a liberal moderate, but a moderate nevertheless—and he did not fare as well.

In view of the Scammon-Wattenberg contention that Carter may lose and the data I have presented indicating he may win, the reader may be confused and not know what to believe. If so, then I have accomplished my purpose.

The Scammon-Wattenberg analysis is both well done and interesting—and, to me, fun. But such peeks into the future are, in my judgment, as likely to mislead as to predict. Too much can happen between now and 1980, not the least of which is the selection of a specific candidate to oppose Mr. Carter. ☐

Mr. Scammon and Mr. Wattenberg respond: *Our piece attempted to describe one key aspect of Carter's victory—his victory in the South—and, further, to suggest that his current course—a drift leftward, as we see it—if pursued would diminish his chances to carry not only the South but the rest of the country. Mr. Roper's analysis is quite interesting, but does not seem to contradict our view.*

Making Ends Meet: How Families Cope with Inflation & Recession

by David Caplovitz

Not since the Great Depression has the country experienced a recession as severe as that of 1975—a recession that arrived almost simultaneously with the highest rates of inflation in this century. Recession and rampant inflation have been the central domestic issues in our society since 1973, and given their persistence, it is important for policy makers to know how damaging these dire economic events have been to the social fabric of society.

The previous calamity in the American economy, the Great Depression of the thirties, inspired a broad range of social research on the effects of the depression on society. The disastrous state of the economy in the mid-seventies, however, has failed to stimulate comparable interest in research.

To fill the gap in our knowledge about the seventies, a proposal was submitted to the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems, a division of the National Institute of Mental Health, outlining a plan to survey families in four major cities. The project was

funded in 1975, and the survey took place in May and June of 1976—a time when the rates of inflation and unemployment had both dropped from their peaks but when economic conditions, especially for city dwellers, were still well below normal.

New York City, Detroit, Atlanta and San Francisco—representing four different parts of the country—were the targets of the survey, and roughly 500 interviews were conducted in each area for a total of 1,982 families. Single persons, divorced and separated persons were deliberately undersampled, and the poor and retired—both suspected to be especially vulnerable to inflation—were oversampled. Small towns and rural areas were also excluded, of course. With these caveats in mind, the samples can still be treated as representative of four urban populations: blue collar families, white collar families, the poor and the retired.

This article reports primarily on the impact of inflation and recession upon the attitudes of the families we surveyed, but before turning to that subject, it may be useful to summarize some of the other key findings from the interviews:

- Overall, about 59 percent of the families interviewed had actually fallen behind financially because of inflation (37 percent were a little worse off than they had been a few years before, and 22 percent were a lot worse off); a similar number, 60 percent, reported that they had been adversely affected by the recession.

- The effects of inflation and recession were very uneven, as the poor, the semi-skilled and unskilled, the poorly educated, blacks and Spanish-speaking citizens were much more likely to be hard hit than more privileged groups. In a very real sense, inflation and recession serve to exacerbate the natural cleavages in society between the more and less privileged and for that reason are potentially dangerous to basic stability.

- The most popular way to cope with inflation was to curtail expenditures, especially by shifting from more expensive to less expensive foods. Over a third of the families also tried to raise their incomes by working more overtime or, less frequently, by sending an additional member into the workforce or by moonlighting. Poor and low-income families, however, were much less successful at this strategy: many of them are unable to work harder even when they want to. Two of the strategies used more often by the have-nots were greater self-reliance and bargain hunting. These might be considered the poor man's strategies for coping with inflation.

- Apparently, the economic stresses of the 1970s have not caused marital or mental strains for many families: only 14 percent said that inflationary pressures had made their marriages worse while over half said they had avoided any mental strain.

Impact on Attitudes: Why People Lose Faith in Free Enterprise

An important objective of the study, as noted earlier, was to determine the impact of inflation and recession

Note: This article is adapted from a study by the same title that was published earlier this year by the Institute for Research on Human Affairs at the Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York.

upon people's attitudes. Having been jarred out of their normal living routines, would people change their basic value orientations and views toward life and what was important and unimportant? We tried to answer that question by exploring the attitudes of families in three areas: their commitment to the American economic system, their aspirations with regard to living standards, and their confidence in government. In each of these areas, it was found that the economic calamities of recent years have had a major impact.

To test attitudes toward capitalism, two questions were initially posed to respondents: (1) *Do you think our free enterprise economy is the best economic system or do you think that some other system is better?* and, (2) *Do you think that a socialist kind of system would be better or worse than what we have now?* The results showed that an overwhelming majority of Americans still remain faithful to our economic system: 64 percent said they felt free enterprise was the best economic system, only 12 percent said no, and the remainder, 24 percent, were uncertain. Similarly, only 10 percent thought socialism was a better economic system, 61 percent disagreed, and 29 percent were uncertain.

As another test of radicalization, respondents were also asked: *Do you think the government is obligated to find a job for everyone who wants to work?* A majority of the sample, 57 percent, said the government did not bear such an obligation, while 43 percent said that it did.

A more interesting finding—though not a surprising one—was that the degree of support for free enterprise and the degree of opposition to government-guaranteed jobs varied considerably according to the impact of inflation. Those who had been hit hardest by inflation had the least commitment to free enterprise and gave the greatest support to government-provided jobs as shown by this table:

	How Inflation Has Affected You			
	Better Now	Same	Little Worse	Lot Worse
Percent totally committed to free enterprise	61%	54%	47%	34%
Percent opposed to government providing jobs	72	59	56	45
Respondents	(308)	(493)	(733)	(422)

It was apparent in the survey that those groups in the population who had been buffeted most strongly by inflation were also the ones who had least faith in free enterprise. For instance, 59 percent of higher white collar workers were totally committed to free enterprise, compared to 35 percent of blue collar workers. Similarly, 56 percent of all whites expressed a commitment to free enterprise in contrast to only 26 percent of blacks and 21 percent of the Spanish-speaking population. The

critical question is whether underprivileged groups have more radical perspectives *independent* of the degree they are suffering from inflation. To answer that, we had previously asked respondents a series of eleven questions probing how much they were suffering from inflation—and then divided respondents into those who were hardest hit subjectively ("high sufferers") versus those who were least affected ("low sufferers"). This next table shows the relative degree of commitment to the dominant economic ideology by both income and by the degree of suffering from inflation:

	Income			
	Under \$7,000	\$7,000- \$13,999	\$14,000- \$19,999	\$20,000 & Over
Percent totally committed to free enterprise				
Low sufferers	50%	53%	60%	68%
High sufferers	27	34	46	55
Percent opposed to government guaranteed jobs				
Low sufferers	53	61	68	75
High sufferers	33	43	55	66
Low sufferers	(91)	(135)	(205)	(321)
High sufferers	(294)	(248)	(227)	(137)

As can be seen, the degree of suffering from inflation is only one determinant of people's commitment to capitalism: income level or place in society also has a major influence. The higher the income, the greater the proportion who accept the dominant ideology, and conversely, the lower the income, the greater the proportion of those who reject it. In short, inflation plays a significant role in how people feel about free enterprise and government-guaranteed jobs. But a person's location in the social structure is also important.

Lowering of Aspirations

In another series of questions, respondents were asked about the effects of the economy upon their aspirations



and standard of living. The questions and distribution of responses were as follows:

1. Have you decided to lower your standard of living to make ends meet? Yes 35%
No 65
100
2. Do you find yourself more interested in owning expensive things than you used to be, less interested or has there been no change? More 8%
Less 22
No change 70
100
3. Do you find that the events of the past couple of years have led you to lose confidence in the American Dream? Yes 35%
No 65
100

As might be expected, those who were most likely to lower their aspirations were also the ones hardest hit by inflation. For example, among those who had suffered the least from inflation, only 4 percent recorded a considerable lowering of aspirations, while among those who suffered the most from inflation, the number rose to 26 percent. Unlike our findings with regard to free enterprise and government-guaranteed jobs, however, the survey indicated that the decision to lower one's aspirations is not related to one's position in society but only to one's experience with inflation. The people who suffered the most from inflation were more ready to lower their standard of living in order to make ends meet, were much less interested in owning expensive things, and had lost confidence in the American dream to a much greater extent than those who were not affected by inflation. But if families had not been hurt by inflation, they showed that they were maintaining their aspirations for a better life.

Confidence in Government

A final series of attitudinal questions in the survey probed the relationship between economic stress and people's feelings toward the government.

At one point, respondents were asked who they thought was most at fault for inflation and were provided with a list of potential villains, including big business, unions, government and politicians. It turned out that only a small minority blamed big business and the unions (15 percent and 14 percent, respectively). Fully 34 percent, however, blamed the government, and another 20 percent blamed the actors in government, the politicians. In short, more than half the sample placed the blame on government or politicians.

For policy makers, the more interesting point is not just the relatively low level of faith in public institutions—a well-documented fact—but the degree to which that confidence level is linked to the success of the economy. As can be seen from this table, those whose financial situation had actually improved in re-

cent years were not nearly as likely to have a low opinion of government as those whose financial situation had gotten much worse:

	How Inflation Has Affected You			
	Better Now	Same	Little Worse	Lot Worse
Confidence in Government				
High	27%	29%	20%	18%
Medium	38	35	37	31
Low	34	36	43	51
Respondents (305)	(477)	(710)	(406)	

Unlike what we saw in explaining people's attitudes toward free enterprise, social position or social class appears to have little bearing upon people's confidence in government. Income levels, for example, show no relationship at all to opinions about the government: 44 percent of those in the lowest income group expressed low confidence in government compared to 41 percent of the highest income group. Among blacks, 49 percent registered little confidence in government; among whites, 40 percent; and among Spanish speaking, 34 percent. Whether people have confidence in government, then, is primarily influenced by whether they have been victims of inflation and recession, and not whether they are rich or poor, black or white, well educated or poorly educated.

* * *

In summary, what the findings of this survey indicate is that the economic setback of the mid-1970s did not cause a wholesale breakdown of social or psychological life in the United States. Many people escaped the ravages of inflation and recession altogether; most people did not have their marriages damaged by inflation and recession; most people did not experience mental strain because of these economic upheavals; and a majority retained their faith in free enterprise, in the American dream and in their government. The well-to-do were particularly well endowed with assets and resources to absorb inflationary pressures. Judging from the recent rise in mortgage borrowing, equal to the appreciation in value of the nation's private housing, it may well be that their home is the greatest asset for the well-to-do, as many of them have been able to refinance their mortgages and use the money to afford their regular consumer purchases.

Yet it is also abundantly clear from this survey that the twin evils of inflation and recession have had a major, adverse impact upon less well-to-do families: they have been the first victims of these economic pressures, and because they have suffered the greatest financial and emotional strains, they also show the greatest alienation from American society. So far, the populace has faced these economic crises with seeming equanimity—there have been no marches, no riots and few signs of radicalization. Whether that equanimity will continue is a question that must hang heavily over economic policy makers today. ☐

Polls and Politics: The French Elections

by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Not only have public opinion polls become an important factor in democratic elections everywhere, but politicians and political observers have become progressively more concerned that the polls sometimes shape election sentiment as well as reflect it. Nowhere have political polls aroused more interest or more suspicion than in France—a nation with several first-rate polling organizations, each with an excellent record in predicting election outcomes.

Last year French interest and suspicion stimulated a great national debate which culminated in the passage of a law by parliament making polls—like so many other aspects of French national life—an object of detailed national regulation. The most widely publicized aspect of the new law (Loi n° 77-808 du 19 juillet 1977 relative à la publication et à la diffusion de certains sondages d'opinion) published in the *Journal Officiel*, July 20, 1977, prohibited the publication or distribution of public opinion polls (and also public comment on such polls) for one week preceding each stage of an election.

To further protect the nation against the pollsters, the parliament provided that publication of all polls having any relation "direct or indirect" to any election or referendum must include the name of the responsible polling firm, the name of the client who commissioned the poll, the number of persons interviewed and the dates during which the interviews were carried out. With characteristic Gallic thoroughness, the law also required that at the time of a poll's publication, the pollster must file with a newly established Commission on Polls precise information on the survey's purpose, size and type of sample,

interview schedule, number of persons who refused to be interviewed and statements concerning the type of method used to interpret the findings and its limitations.

Debate surrounding the law made clear that its supporters thought that predictions could influence election outcomes (either through a bandwagon reflex or its opposite), that any such influence is undesirable, and further, that the quality of polls is a matter of legitimate public concern. Opponents of the government bill argued that prohibiting the publication of polls was a futile and unwarranted interference with the liberty of the press.

Were the Polls Really Wrong?

So far, the consequences of the government's determined effort to impose quality controls on political polling have not been encouraging. The law more or less succeeded in prohibiting the mass distribution of new polls in the week preceding the national legislative election of March 12 and March 19 (though there was a good deal of semi-public discussion of leaked findings), but the polls published prior to the ban were unusually—in fact, uniquely—misleading concerning the election's outcome. Everyone now knows that while the polls showed widespread dissatisfaction with the existing government and were almost unanimous in predicting a victory of the left, the ruling coalition of the center-right emerged with a solid 91-seat majority.

From the earliest returns of the first ballot, it seemed clear that both the left and the pollsters were in trouble. For months preceding the elections, the left coalition (Socialists, Communists, and

left Radicals) had been running five to eight points ahead in the polls, but in the first ballot, the "Majority" eked out a narrow lead (46.5 percent to 45.3 percent), a development clearly foretelling defeat of the left in the runoff.

Since that time many explanations of the polls' "bad performance" have been offered. Some journalists and politicians have blamed the polls for sampling urban areas, for trying to get by with too small a sample, and for reflecting the leftist bias which is so common among French intellectuals. The pollsters, in turn, have blamed the government for causing them to stop surveying too far in advance of the election, thus missing last minute trends; they have also credited President Giscard d'Estaing with turning opinion around with his election eve appeal for the "Majority"; and they have suggested that many French voters who had intended to vote Socialist drew back at the last minute out of fear that they would propel the French Communist Party into government for the first time in more than three decades.

In fact, as can be seen from table 1, the pre-election polls of all the major polling organizations concerning the strength of several major parties—the Communists (P.C.), the Gaullists (R.P.R.) and the new Giscardists (U.D.F.)—were very close indeed to their first ballot showing. The one group whose strength at the ballot box differed sharply from their strength in the polls was the Socialists (P.S.). Virtually all of the polls reported for months in advance of the election that the Socialists would draw about 28 percent of the total vote, but on election day they fell some 5 percent below this

estimate, badly skewing the overall predictions about a victory of the left. The accuracy of pollsters' findings on the P.C., R.P.R. and U.D.F. suggests rather strongly, then, that the discrepancy between findings and outcomes is not explained by sampling error, but rather by last minute shifts away from the Socialists. This inference is supported by the assertion of Mme. Helene Riffault of IFOP (France's Gallup affiliate) that her organization had discerned the shift two days in advance of the first ballot but was prohibited by law from publishing the news.

Deep-Seated Doubts on the Left

There were always good grounds for questioning whether the polls showing a left majority in France would be translated into an electoral victory. Among those expressing support for the left were many who retained deep doubts about Communist participation in government. These doubts were strongest among some of the "independents" inclined to vote Socialist as a protest against the government and among old Socialists who continued to regard the Communists as the chief enemy.

Studies of French public opinion have long since established the existence of independents (frequently termed "le marais") who have little interest in or information about politics and have no firm ideological commitments but are nonetheless suspicious of and hostile to the French Communist Party. During the pre-election period, many in "le marais" leaned toward the Socialists,

even though they did not favor the Socialists' commitment to expand government nationalization of industry. Leaders of the center-right parties focused much of their campaign on the effort to move these weak partisans out of the Socialist camp—first, by emphasizing the Communist role in a government of the left, and, second, by reminding voters that the Socialists *really were socialists*, committed to wide-scale nationalization and to the transformation of the French economy. The success of this strategy was reflected in the first phase of the election.

Additional defections from the left occurred among more strongly committed Socialists who withheld their votes on the second ballot when the local candidate of the left turned out to be a Communist. Such resistance to the Communist candidates has been reflected in second-ballot voting patterns since 1967 when the Socialist and Communist parties forged their first electoral alliance since the 1930s. Despite pleas from the Socialist leadership, even more Socialist rank and file voters withheld their support from Communist candidates this year than in the past.

Moving toward the Center

For now, the union of the French left would seem to be in total disarray, ruptured first by the extreme demands and intransigence of Communist leaders and then rejected by the voters. Doubtless, these developments will strengthen the influence within the Socialist party of those who have always had reservations about an alliance with the Communists.

New alternatives will almost certainly be explored, and the most obvious of these—forming a center-left coalition with the Giscardists—will almost surely be discussed, despite resistance by many left Socialists.

Whatever the outcome of such discussions, the failure of the "united left" strategy and the strong showing of the Giscardists in the 1978 legislative elections strongly suggest that France is now emerging from the Gaullist period of bipolarization and is moving inexorably back toward a pattern of politics oriented toward the center.

How the new law governing public opinion polls may have affected the election outcome this year cannot be stated with certainty. Obviously, the many polls showing a probable victory for the left did not encourage more voters to jump on this bandwagon. It may be argued that publication of polls showing a last minute trend away from the Socialists would have stimulated greater effort by Socialist sympathizers. But turnout was very high in any case, and we cannot be certain that a Herculean last minute effort at mobilizing Socialist support would have had the desired effect; it might just as easily have backfired. Probably the most important effect of the law was to reintroduce a greater element of surprise into the election outcome and thereby to heighten the drama. Perhaps that is justification enough for the law in a nation which has always tended to confuse the aesthetic and political domains.

☐

Table 1

TRENDS IN FRENCH PRE-ELECTION POLLS

	Figaro	Express	Le Point	Le Matin & Le Nouvel Observateur	Figaro	Express	Figaro	Aurore	Aurore	Figaro	Le Matin	1st Ballot Counts	2nd Ballot Counts
	Sofres 1/9-10	Louis Harris 1/12-16	IFOP 1/27-2/1	Louis Harris 1/30-2/1	Sofres 2/1-3	Louis Harris 2/9-11	Sofres 2/14-17/2	Publimetrie 16-17/24-25/2	Publimetrie 16-17/24-25/2	Sofres 25-28/27-3/1	Louis Harris 25-28/27-3/1		
PARTIES ENDORSING THE COMMON PROGRAM	49	50	50	49	48	48	48	48	48	49	49	45.3	49.3
Communist Party (PC)	21	21	20	21	20	20	21	20	21	21	21	20.6	
Socialist Party (PS)		27	28	26		26					26	22.6	
Left Radicals (MRG)	28	2	2	2	28	2	27	27	27	28	2	2.1	
MAJORITY	44	45	44	45	45	45	45	46	47	45	45	46.5	50.7
Centrists & Radicals	7	8		8	9			9	8				
Giscardists (UDF)			20			19	20			20	21	21.5	
Republicans (PR)	16	15		16	14			13	13				
Gaullists (RPR)	21	22	22	21	21	22	22	21	22	22	22	22.6	
Other Majority			2		1	4	3	3	4	3	2	2.4	
OTHERS *	7	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	5	6	6	8.2	

Source for polling data: Le Monde, March 14, 1978.

Source for election outcome: Press and Information Division of the French Embassy.

Extreme left, Ecologists, extreme right, other parties.

ISRAEL, BACK TO SQUARE ONE

(Continued from page 20.)

tian-Israeli negotiations did reduce the opposition somewhat, but as of late January, half the Israeli public also wanted to keep that area in their own hands. Thus, Sadat's journey did little to budge Israeli views on most territories.

The disposition of the West Bank—or Judea and Samaria, as the area is called by many Jews, including Prime Minister Begin—has long been a perplexing problem for Israelis. In the decade that followed the 1967 war, there was almost unanimous opposition to establishing an independent Arab state there. Many Israelis did not regard Yasser Arafat or the PLO as true representatives of Palestinian Arabs, and they saw the establishment of an independent state as a dagger pointed at the heart of Israel. Nevertheless, only about 60 percent of the Jewish Israelis were anxious to keep the area in Israeli hands; about 40 percent were willing to return most or all of it to Jordan.

In the diplomatic maneuvering that followed the Sadat visit, however, there were signs of a new phenomenon in the perspective of Israelis. Prime Minister Begin's call for an autonomous West Bank—under the security supervision of Israel—represents the first time that an Israeli government has proposed a program of its own for the future of the West Bank. Significantly, that proposal immediately became the basis for a possible new consensus of Israeli opinion. When Mr. Begin first put forward his proposal, fully 50 percent of the Israeli public rallied behind it. Following Sadat's criticism and his suspension of talks in Jerusalem, Jewish support of the government's proposal rose even higher to 59 percent.

Thus, in a very concrete sense, the emphasis that President Sadat placed upon territories in his Knesset address and in subsequent statements appears to have had a boomerang effect in Israel. The vast majority of Israelis has never felt that preliminary decisions about the administered territories are at the core of the problem of peace with their Arab neighbors. To the Jews, recognition of Israel's right to exist and bringing an end to Arab dreams of pushing Israel into the sea are the fundamental problems. Thus, when Israelis understood that Sadat was breaking off negotiations over preliminary territorial issues, they apparently became more defense conscious and less willing to make territorial concessions. There has also been a growing desire among Israelis to let the controversial settlements remain in the Rafiah area. Before the recent negotiations began, there was little enthusiasm for such settlements.

Now, however, there is a stable majority opposed to removal of Israeli supervision over existing settlements.

The U.S.: Liked but not Followed

Throughout the tortuous course of international diplomacy, even during occasional strains between U.S. and Israeli leadership, there has been little evidence that Israeli friendship and trust in the United States has diminished. For years, a strong majority of Israelis—fluctuating between 65 and 85 percent—has believed that the United States is a sincere friend.

Yet there has been an equally strong conviction among Jewish Israelis that America is not necessarily the best judge of their nation's interests. A vast majority, for instance, opposed the "Rogers plan" during the Nixon years and has stood firm against related proposals since then. At the turn of this year a widespread feeling arose in Israel that the United States was asking for too many territorial concessions. One effect of the Sadat visit was to strengthen a majority view that Israel should attempt to reach agreements with Arab countries without waiting for American mediation. A vast majority continues to believe that Israel must resist any strong American pressure to impose a solution, and a majority also believes that the United States is out to exert such pressure. On the other hand, there has been a growing sense in Israel that the United States may no longer be trying to establish an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank—a step that would be in sharp defiance of Israeli opinion, as we have seen. Moreover, half the population believes it important that the United States keep up the buffer zone in the Sinai between Israeli and Egyptian armed forces.

Concluding Observations

In retrospect, it hardly seems surprising that President Sadat's "sacred journey for peace," as audacious and inspired as it was, failed to change Israeli public opinion on fundamental issues such as the administered territories. Over the past ten years, the Israeli public has consistently demonstrated that it does not react strongly to promises and to personalities, but rather to events.

Thus, the sheer force of Sadat's personality and courage was warmly applauded in Israel, but standing alone, it was not sufficient to change Israeli perceptions of their own security interests.

A more interesting question of immediate significance is whether any Israeli government, if it so decided, could convince a majority of the people that major territorial concessions should be



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made in order to keep the peace negotiations going and to satisfy American pressures.

It is true that in the past, on almost every occasion, over 80 percent of the public—regardless of political affiliation—has supported the government's major foreign policy decisions after the fact. Yet the distinguishing feature of each of those decisions was that the government was taking a stand on an issue on which public opinion was previously divided. In those cases, the public proved willing to support a government proposal which was not against any consensus. This history would suggest that in January, had Prime Minister Begin suggested that the West Bank be returned to Jordan, he might well have rallied public support behind him; there were already enough Israelis who agreed with that position—at least 40 percent—that they could have formed the basis of a consensus. There is no basis for believing, however, that Mr. Begin could have swung Israeli opinion behind him had he instead proposed the establishment of an independent Arab state on the West Bank, as sought by many in the West and by an array of Arab leaders. For over ten years, opposition to such an independent state has been virtually unanimous among Jewish Israelis. It is conceivable that under a very special set of circumstances—where not just the Egyptians but other Arabs have convinced the Israeli people they are sincerely dedicated to peace—that there may be a change in the Israeli consensus regarding territorial concessions. But that would require positive deeds on the part of the Arab countries—improving on Sadat's first move—and not just words. ☑

Somewhere we are going to have to generate a larger confidence, not just as to the satisfactory condition of our circumstances, but in the essential purpose of the country. In the end, you have to have a purpose to inform your policy. And our purpose has to be to ensure that free societies survive the mortmain of the Soviet Union—a dead, dreary culture, which nonetheless has advantages in its encounter with us. It does have advantages, Henry, you've experienced them.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Mr. Wattenberg: *How do we go about rallying the public toward the issue of freedom that both of you have spoken so eloquently about in the past? What is the agenda? What comes first? What should we do?*

Senator Moynihan: Presidents do it, and they do it by taking a stand. And they say, "Here we are and we will not move, that's all; while I'm here, we won't move." The trouble is, the last President who did that was Lyndon Johnson, and that's the misery of it all.

What do you think, Henry, now that you have a perspective of thirteen, fourteen months out of office?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it cannot be done without the President. The President has to explain, and he has to be willing to explain even if it runs counter to elite views. And he has to keep explaining it.

Second, the traditional establishment isn't going to help much in this effort. But I think there are leaders around this country—in business, in labor, in law and maybe even in universities—who are not part of a defeatist consensus and who could be mobilized, who could be given confidence and who could inspire confidence. The problem is that our country is so amorphous that no one is organizing them, and when I say organize, I mean things like discussion groups.

In the 1950s, we had discussion groups on arms control at Harvard and MIT, at a time when one thought serious thinking made a difference and before intellectuals became totally power mad and tried to effect tomorrow's policy.

Mr. Wattenberg: *As you look back now over the two administrations that you served, Dr. Kissinger, do you think that those administrations did a good enough job at raising the passionate standard of freedom?*

Dr. Kissinger: You have to remember what we were up against. We found 550,000 troops abroad, and the very people who had put them there were purging their souls by depriving us of

any possibility of negotiating their withdrawal. Whatever position was being adopted by our government, they went three steps further, so that all the North Vietnamese had to do was to wait. So this country was being torn apart. Every defense program was being challenged; the view of American over-extension was widespread.

At that time, it was difficult to maintain the defense budget against the constant assault. It was difficult to move out of Vietnam under some controlled plan—which was, after all, all we wanted; we above all did not want to tempt the Soviets into any adventures. That was the context in which we had to operate. And I think we managed to preserve the American honor and to maintain a strong foreign policy within this context. Throughout we stood for human rights quietly. We managed to increase Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union from 400 a year to 35,000.

Then came 1974. The first time we had a chance, after Watergate, to do the positive thing was in that year. Maybe we were still so shell-shocked by the events that we didn't seize the moment early enough.

But you have to remember, leaders have to conduct the policies that the circumstances make possible for them. And at the time of the war, the universities were rioting, every day there were people walking around with coffins in front of the White House, people were signing books of the war dead—as if we were not conscious of the fact that people were dying. In that period, there

would have been no support for a crusading policy, as you have suggested; our worry was that the assault on our foreign policy would collapse all our commitments.

When we appointed Pat to the U.N., we showed an understanding, at least, of what was needed. He was appointed because I read an article of his in *Commentary* which made exactly your point. But whether the turnaround in our policy happened quickly enough or not, I'll leave that open.

Mr. Wattenberg: *Dr. Kissinger, did the policy of détente—in declaring a relaxation of tensions—let us lower our guard? You're familiar with that argument.*

Dr. Kissinger: I'm familiar with that argument. But if you look at the internal discussions, you will see that we never unilaterally gave up a weapons system during this period; we resisted—or sought to resist—every Communist geopolitical maneuver.

In 1972, as a result of decisions made in the 1960s, and as a result of budgets imposed on us by the Congress in the 1970s, we had no strategic weapons program that could be produced for five years. We speeded up our programs after the SALT agreement in 1972. I think if you look at the record, you will find that the White House always chose the highest defense option that came over from the Pentagon. There was no illusion on our part that we could deal with the Soviet Union from a position of weakness. There was no illusion that



"If I have one fear for the future, it would be that a kind of a reaction on the right could be coming. . . ."

Moynihan

"... we have the paradox that governments following public opinion polls begin to look more and more incompetent. And as they look incompetent, confidence in government begins to disintegrate. . . ."

Kissinger

we could win the hearts and minds of men as a substitute for a foreign policy, though we didn't reject winning the hearts and minds of men.

The problem we had was that we had to demonstrate we were not an obstacle to peace, and we also had to show that we could conduct a strong foreign policy. To mesh these two in the "civil war" atmosphere that existed proved not always easy.

Mr. Wattenberg: *Let me ask this, Dr. Kissinger: you talked about a "civil war" in the country and people with coffins, and gory things that did, in fact, go on. Yet those were, I believe, activities of the elites. But as you've said today, and as I believed then, the public was still behind the President. You know, Nixon beat McGovern, and everybody forgot that LBJ had beaten Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary without even going up there. Is it possible, with 20-20 hindsight, that the Nixon administration perhaps overreacted to the elites and didn't rally public opinion when it was, in fact, reliable? Was this a misperception by the administration?*

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Nixon did make that speech on November 3, 1969. But Nixon did not have the grace of reaching out. It was one of his great weaknesses.

You must also recognize that when you have the elites against you, even if you have the mass of the population for you, the constant drum fire of elite opinion creates significant doubt. Washington is a curious city in the sense that the one thing you can be sure everybody reads is columnists who may not be read outside of Washington in any significant numbers. It may be that there is an element of auto-suggestion here.

But again, I would say we actually did succeed in the objectives we set for ourselves in Vietnam. We had one principal objective: that we would not end the war in which 50,000 Americans had been killed by installing a Communist government. This was the one demand that we could not accept; it is the one demand Hanoi never changed until October 1972. And we achieved this objective. The fact that it then failed was due more to Watergate—which was totally unpredictable—than to the policy.

South Vietnam collapsed in large part because—as a result of Watergate—the Congress in two successive years cut aid to South Vietnam by 50 percent and the Congress passed a law that prohibited any military action in and around Vietnam to maintain the agreement.

Mr. Wattenberg: *Senator Moynihan, let me ask you about your U.N. experience.*

Your position then, as I recall it, was criticized on the grounds that perhaps it represented a new moral crusade and a falling into the "Wilsonian trap." In view of that experience, what ought to be our method of rallying public opinion which, as I gather from this conversation, is really the central problem in the West?

Senator Moynihan: Let me first say very explicitly that when I spoke out at the United Nations, I was carrying out the policies of the secretary of state and the President.

We were criticized by people whose basic attitude was fearful. You cannot explain why they said "never anger a Russian," except for their fear that he would gobble us up in consequence.

I will always remember the last day of the General Assembly that I was there for. The United States, as the host country, gives the penultimate speech at the General Assembly. Then the president of the assembly speaks.

My speech was not very friendly. As a General Assembly, I said, we hadn't done anything to distinguish ourselves. But there would be another one, and our delegation would be there. Don't anybody doubt it, we'll again be just as hard to live with if the rest of you continue to behave the way everyone seemingly wants to behave toward us. And then I proceeded to quote Sakharov.

Half an hour before I was to give the speech, Soviet Ambassador Malik had asked me to come to the back of the assembly chamber to meet with him. He sat down and said, "You have this quote from Mr. Sakharov." I said, "Yes." He said, "He is an enemy of the Soviet people." I said, "But surely not. He's a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, your most distinguished scientist. He helped build your hydrogen bomb."

"He is an enemy of the Soviet people. You must not do it."

I said, "Well, I surely can't accept that thought."

And so when in my speech I got to this little passage of Sakharov, up gets Malik and out he walks. I paused for a long while and let everybody turn around and see this representative of a great powerful country incapable of hearing a paragraph from a Nobel Peace Laureate.

Now, consider the advantage we have. We are politically and psychologically the more powerful of these two cultures. This would come with our asserting it once again.

I don't know what the dynamic is but it needs to be asserted. Right now you've got an elite which is rather behind the country.

If I have one fear for the future, it would be that a kind of a reaction on

the right could be coming—the kind you used to talk about, Henry. And it would come with the left in no mood to do battle—as if they were ashamed of what they had done.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. I don't think you can attack the values of a middle-class society systematically without getting some reaction.

Mr. Wattenberg: *Let me come back to an earlier point. What should the President of the United States do? We've said that he's the man who's got to rally the country. But what should he actually do? Is it a public relations campaign?*

Senator Moynihan: Dr. Kissinger, as a distinguished member of the opposition, here is your chance.

Dr. Kissinger: I was going to say he is your President. [Laughter.] I supported his opponent.

I think the President has to define the issues and stick with it—not just put forward some proposals and then let them drop like a stone in the water—and become an educator of the public.

Then he has to mobilize that part of elite opinion—or create a new elite—that can help him get the word around the country. Incidentally, all of this is "do-able."

I also believe that the success of this President is really quite important for the country. We haven't had a successful two-term administration since the 1950s.

Senator Moynihan: Dwight Eisenhower.

Dr. Kissinger: So that anyone who is younger than forty will probably not remember what it was like to have a more or less normal government.

But I think the President has to convey the impression that he is in command of events, not that he succeeds all the time, but that he seeks to dominate events.

For example, on the issue of Communism in Europe, I do not understand how an administration dedicated to human rights can say, as was said for a year, "We can work with any party. Of course, we prefer another one, but if they come to power, we can work with them."

We have to make agreements with the Soviets on a number of issues, but I think we also have to make clear to the public that we are facing a profound geopolitical and ideological challenge. This is especially true if there is a SALT agreement this year.

And if the President and his people do not do it, then it leads to confusion.

Senator Moynihan: It leads to fear at home of an order that makes any finally concluded SALT agreement terribly difficult to get approved. We will have to assert ourselves if we're not going to be overwhelmed by fear. ☑

Collector's Items

BY DAVID GERGEN

The 14 Percent Solution: Can Jimmy Carter stop his perilous slide in the polls, and if so, how much of his popularity can he restore?

Recent history shows that major presidential comebacks are possible but they have never come spontaneously or by setting a new tone at the White House: they have been created instead through swift, decisive counterstrokes that snapped people to attention.

Curiously, while past rallies have varied in timing and duration, their magnitude has also fit a common pattern: a king-sized rally for our recent presidents has always worked out to be about 14 points on the Gallup approval rating.

John Kennedy, for instance, was drifting downward during 1962 when the Cuban missile crisis fueled the biggest boost of his presidential career—from 62 to 76 percent approval, a jump of 14 points.

Lyndon Johnson could never manage more than several mini-rallies until he stunned the nation with his withdrawal speech in 1968, and then he enjoyed two major surges—one an immediate 13-point climb and the other a 14-point late in his term.

Richard Nixon was sagging badly in 1971, the third year of his presidency,

when he shook up the economy—and his poll ratings—with wage and price controls. Continuing his comeback with trips to Peking and Moscow, he cruised into the 1972 election with a 62 percent approval rating, exactly 14 points higher than before his economic counterthrust. A few months later, his ratings bounced up again with the Vietnam settlement, but that rise disappeared overnight in the flood of Watergate.

For Gerald Ford, the *Mayaguez* incident was the electrifying event behind his biggest rise in the polls, this one of a 15-point variety.

With Gallup now showing him at 39 percent approval (and NBC only 29), Mr. Carter may think the idea of a 14-point rally is a bit paltry. But if he dips into that Truman biography on his bedside table, he will find there was one man who shattered all the records: by reacting swiftly to a coal strike and to the challenges of the cold war, HST came back 28 points in the second year of his presidency and then he put together a meteoric rise of 33 points when he whipped Tom Dewey. With all its tough talk of late, the White House may indeed be looking for a new rallying cry: "Give 'em hell, Jimmy." ☒

Presidential Balm: If it is any consolation to Mr. Carter, Jerry Brown also appears to be in free fall (he's down to 29 points in Mervin Field's California Poll), and other heads of state are flying in rough weather, too: with elections just over the horizon in Canada, the opposition party has just caught up with Prime Minister Trudeau's party

for the first time in a year; Chancellor Schmidt is skidding in West Germany; Prime Minister Callaghan's Laborites are losing ground in British polls; Prime Minister Begin has plummeted some 20 points in Israeli polls, and Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan has hit what must surely be rock bottom—a 20 percent approval rating. There seem to be thorns in every rose garden. ☒

The Taste of France: How would the average Frenchman most enjoy spending an evening? To the horror of the culinary world, 45 percent said recently they would prefer seeing a movie, 30 percent voted for a good book and only 21 percent said they would prefer dining out in a good French restaurant (sorry, those were the only choices).

The survey, taken by a respected survey organization working with two connoisseurs, had other unsettling news as well. The Communists, it seems, have developed the most expensive palates in France (their favorite fare is lobster followed by lightly cooked red meat in a rich sauce), while conservatives and Socialists are willing to settle for grilled meat (not too spicy).

In rating international foods, the French did give four stars to their own chefs, one star to the Italian and Chinese, and only a tiny sliver to those of India, Russia and England. The French, you see, still have their pride; but they don't always like to eat it. ☒

Why Keep Up with the Smiths? In our last issue, we reported that very few Iowans thought they would wind up in hell, but many said they had a neighbor who would.

Now comes news from two other states confirming that brotherly love this year may not include much brotherly respect.

In Minnesota, only a tiny handful, 4 percent, told a poll sponsored by the *Minneapolis Tribune* that they "deserved" to go to hell—but 20 percent said they knew of someone else who was a "sure bet" for damnation.

And in Florida, on a very different issue, most folks told the *Miami Herald* they were pretty natty dressers (the average man owned 9.8 business suits and 1.6 leisure suits), but "they think other Floridians on the whole are an unfashionable lot." Maybe this summer we can declare an end to national grumpiness. ☒



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The Washington Star
John P. Roche

New handles on those slippery statistics

There are in the United States perhaps a dozen top-flight public opinion analysts and now, mirabile dictu, they are going to appear in one location, a new bi-monthly magazine, *Public Opinion*, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI). This Washington version of All Souls — the Oxford College with no students where politicians, academics and others gather as fellows — has over the past few years contributed more to political controversy than any comparable institution.

AEI has an advantage over its competition by specializing in punchy essays on contemporary issues. To date, it has not published a massive scholarly "doorstop," an art form "think tanks" usually sponsor. Well, *Public Opinion* is no exception. The March-April

issue contains articles by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg on "Jimmy Carter's Problem," an extremely perceptive piece on America's "Cautious Internationalism" by Daniel Yankelovich, Austin Ranney's predictions on the 1978 congressional elections, an essay on current values by Everett C. Ladd and — among other goodies — a round-up of recent polls on everything from Panama to sexual liberation. A real winner.

The Washington Post
George F. Will

Will the South Stick With Carter?

In 1970, Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, the Ruth and Gehrig of voting analysis, published "The Real Majority," which some Democrats considered depraved because it emphasized that seven of 10 voters were neither young nor poor nor black. The book warned about the predictable consequences of an ideological campaign of the sort Democrats subsequently had with George McGovern.

Now Scammon and Wattenberg have a cautionary message for Jimmy Carter, who has staffed his administration with many of the people who considered the political arithmetic of "The Real Majority" too repulsive to contemplate. The authors' message is in the inaugural issue of "Public Opinion," a journal published by the American Enterprise Institute, a source of consistently convincing analysis of public-policy choices.

After close elections, many gro can say, "You couldn't have out us." But, says Wattenberg, the

voted Republican voted Kennedy in order to prove that a Catholic could win. But Catholicism again been an important vote.

If "southernism," like California's "one-election" issue, id reassert itself in the South

The Washington Star

A continuity of values

What's more perennial than keening about the collapse of traditional values? Why, traditional values, of course.

That, at least, would appear to be the consensus among those who have been doing the most recent pulse and temperature readings on the philosophic state of the nation. *Public Opinion*, the new American Enterprise Institute magazine devoted to surveying the surveys of everybody's thinking, has discovered a hotbed of continuity in popular attitudes on what matters to society and individual human life.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Ear to the Ground

There's a new magazine around that may help people make better use of all the public opinion data that pollsters keep turning out. It's called *Public Opinion*, it comes from the American Enterprise Institute and its first issue offers survey information on everything from Jimmy Carter and violence in the schools to the fact that God recently edged out the State Highway Patrol as the most trusted institution in Iowa. But among the magazine's longer pieces on national opinion, an article by political scientist Everett Ladd gives a specially interesting clue to the policy disappointments emerging from Washington these days.

What Mr. Ladd together and sum pieces of recent question of what public values are not. It's true that wards sex more

TIME

Jimmy's Liability

The "Scammenberg" theory

Can Jimmy Carter get re-elected? Writing in *Public Opinion*, a new bi-monthly published by the conservative American Enterprise Institute, noted psephologists Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg intriguingly argue that if Carter fails to get his White House lease renewed in 1980, the cause may lie not so much in his performance in Washington as in how he got there in the first place.

Scammon and Wattenberg, who backed Henry M. Jackson for the 1976 Democratic nomination, base their argument on the fact that while several constituencies (notably blacks, Jews and labor) can claim that Carter could not have won "without us," only white Southerners can say that he succeeded "because of us." Indeed, the "Scammenberg

Nation

thesis is that Southern whites, in Carter "the margin of difference, done their natural conservatism a degree that "the great po 1976 was that Carter ran the region where recent Democratic candidates had Because of white dissatisfaction with Carter's general national candida of the vote won by De en Southern states in 1960 to less the number of ceived went fr ing reversal 54.1% of the 118 elect But 1976 ele

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The Editors.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Public opinion polls are inherently conservative.

Galluping Toward Dead Center

by Henry Fairlie

I have long believed that public opinion polls inevitably lead to conservative conclusions about the state of the popular mind, and therefore they inevitably have a conservative influence on what politicians do. If proof were needed, it is to be found in a new magazine, called simply *Public Opinion*, published by the American Enterprise Institute. The editors are Seymour Martin Lipset, one of the most influential thinkers among neoconservatives, and Ben J. Wattenberg, the conservative-inclined editor of *The Real Majority*. Among the whom one would such a man Kristol, the

But these are honorable men. The AEI likes to refer to its members as scholars, and scholars would not let their prejudices influence their reading of the polls. What I wish to suggest is a more subtle process: it is natural that "predominantly conservative people" should like the polls, because polls lend themselves to conservative interpretations of what the public is thinking.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Politics and People

By Alan L. Otten

Hostilities

This is a matter profoundly felt on both sides, with many whites who staunchly supported earlier goals of the civil rights movement now swinging against it. Pollster Seymour Martin Lipset and political scientists in the American Enterprise Institute's new "Public Opinion" magazine, cite one opinion poll after another showing large majorities in favor of government or other action to end discrimination but almost as large majorities opposed to preferential treatment as the way to do it.

Public Opinion



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